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Abstract

Fair exchange of digital items via computer networks is an important research topic
in modern cryptography. Generally speaking, a fair exchange protocol can help two
mistrusted parties in networks exchange their digital items in a fair way, that is,
both two parties get each other’s item, or neither of them gets anything valuable
after the protocol runs successfully. In practical applications, the technology of fair
exchange is widely used in different but relevant fields, such as contract signing
protocols, non-repudiation protocols, e-payment system and certified e-mails.
In a fair exchange protocol, a trusted third party (TTP) is usually needed as
an authentic mediator between two mistrusted parties. In order to reduce the load
of such a TTP, the notion of optimistic fair exchange (OFE) is proposed, in which
there is an off-line TTP, called arbitrator, who acts as a judge to settle the dispute
between parties and should only be involved if necessary. In previous studies, fair
exchange is usually carried out between individual parties. When a fair exchange
protocol runs between two members from two distinct groups, anonymity of the
signer in a group could be necessary for achieving better privacy in some cases (e.g.
protecting customers’ trading habits in e-payment systems).
In this thesis, we study optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (OFERS),
i.e., two members from two different groups can exchange their ring signatures in
an equitable way. Each user in these groups has his/her own public-private key
pair and is able to sign a message on behalf of his/her group anonymously due to
the property signer ambiguity inherited from ring signatures. We first define the
security model of OFERS in the multi-user setting under adaptive chosen message,
chosen-key and chosen public-key attacks. Then, based on verifiably encrypted ring
signatures (VERS), we construct a concrete scheme by combining the technologies of
ring signatures, public-key encryption and zero-knowledge proof, and then show that
our OFERS solution is provably secure in our security model and preserving signer
ambiguity of ring signatures. Moreover, we improve the proposed OFERS scheme in
v

order to meet the property abuse-freeness, which means, before the OFE protocol is
successfully executed, any interim result in the protocol cannot be accepted as valid
evidence showing that some participant has committed to complete the protocol.
We propose the formal model of abuse-freeness in OFERS, and construct the first
concrete scheme of abuse-free optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (AOFERS),
which is formally proven perfectly abuse-free in our security model. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first formal work on the topic of optimistic fair exchange
of ring signatures.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, the concept of fair exchange is briefly introduced. After reviewing
some related work on fair exchange protocols, we point out the challenging issues
and our aims on this topic, then summarise our contributions and the organization
of the thesis.

1.1

Fair Exchange

With the pervasive applications of the Internet in the modern world, the traditional ways of information communication have been changed fundamentally. More
and more people prefer electronic information to paper-based documents. Digital
information has numerous advantages in transmission, preservation and searching.
However, when data flow in this vast, free but uncontrolled cyberworld, security,
privacy and authentication of digital information have gradually become very important issues. Hence we need to study how to address these issues by designing
secure and efficient cryptographic tools.
As e-commerce is getting more and more popular and important in business, it
is desirable that two parties can fairly exchange their digital items via the Internet.
In the real world, such an exchange could be very simple, that is, both parties make
an appointment at some time and place, and get together to do the exchange faceto-face. Every party can be considered to obtain what he/she wants simultaneously.
However, in computer networks, such simultaneity does not exist. That is because
the rate of data transmission in networks depends on many complex and uncertain
factors, such as network bandwidth, hardware condition, the physical access location
of computers and even bad weather. It is impractical for any two parties in the
Internet to simultaneously obtain each other’s item in a normal way. That means,
there always exists a party who can first obtain the other’s digital item. A dishonest
1
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party may be therefore benefited from this advantage, which may badly damage
the other’s interests. In order to provide ‘simultaneity’ in networks, fair exchange
protocols are designed based on many different technologies. In fact, these protocols
cannot truly make data transmission simultaneously. The solution of the problem
essentially focuses on the concept of fairness, i.e., at the end of the protocol either
both parties have each other’s item or none of them does. Such fairness should
always hold even though some parties cheating.
A fair exchange protocol basically has at least the properties: fairness and nonrepudiation. Fairness ensures that, if an honest party does not obtain a valid signature of the other party at the end of a fair exchange protocol, the other party
cannot get that either, that is, either both two parties get each other’s valid signature, or neither of them gets anything valuable. Non-repudiation guarantees that
any party in a fair exchange protocol cannot repudiate or refute a valid signature
after the protocol executed successfully. Due to these properties, in practical applications, fair exchange protocols are widely used in different but relevant fields
such as contract signing protocols [BOGMR90, GJM99, BWZZ04], non-repudiation
protocols [KMZ02, GRV03], e-payment system [BF98, PCS03] and certified e-mails
[KM01, ANR02].
In early studies, the most direct method to achieve fair exchange in networks
is gradual exchange protocols [Blu83, EGL85]. In such a protocol, both parties
gradually exchange their digital items bit by bit over many rounds of exchange
until every party obtains the whole expected items. Because only a little amount of
information is transmitted in each round. The expected digital items for each party
can be considered to be revealed approximately at the same time, which guarantees
fairness. However, gradual exchange protocol can hardly be realised in practice.
That is because, the security of these protocols depends on the equal computing
resources for both paries, but such absolute equivalence in networks can not exist
in most applications. Therefore, it is difficult to achieve provable fairness in such a
protocol. Moreover, gradual exchange protocols need to consume a vast amount of
network resources in gradual exchanges, which makes the protocols highly inefficient
and expensive.
To overcome these shortcomings, a fair exchange protocol based on an on-line
trusted third party (TTP) was always designed in the following studies. In such a
protocol [DGLW96, ZG96], all the parties’ digital signatures are sent to the TTP,
which checks the validity of these signatures. If all the signatures are correctly
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prepared, the TTP sends each signature to its corresponding receiver. Because the
TTP is involved in every step of exchanges, a fair exchange protocol based on an
on-line TTP is easily implemented. However, in practice, the on-line TTP may be
inefficient and insecure due to its heavy involvement in the protocol. In addition,
such a TTP is required to be perfectly trusted, which may lead some unexpected
security risks. Comparing with the fair exchange protocols based on an on-line TTP,
the protocols based on an off-line TTP are more practical, efficient and secure due
to the property optimism. To reduce the load of the TTP, Asokan, Schunter and
Waidner first proposed optimistic fair exchange (OFE) in [ASW97]. In an OFE
protocol [ASW98, DLY07, HYWS08b], there is an off-line TTP, called arbitrator,
who acts as a judge to settle the possible dispute between two parties and should
only be involved when the protocol does not run correctly (e.g. some parties cheating
or communication channel interrupted).

1.2

Related Work

In cryptography, the notion of fair exchange is generally referred to a fair exchange
protocol for some kinds of digital signatures. In the recent studies, an optimistic
fair exchange protocol typically comprises three steps. In the first step, Alice, who
first starts the OFE protocol, sends a partial signature generated via an arbitrator’s public key, which shows she has committed to send her full signature to the
verifier Bob later if the protocol is executed correctly, together with an interactive
or non-interactive zero-knowledge proof showing that the partial signature indeed
corresponds to her full signature and can be recovered by the arbitrator. If Alice’s
partial signature is correctly verified, Bob sends his full signature to Alice in the
second step. After checking the validity of Bob’s full signature, Alice sends her full
signature back to Bob in the third step. If Alice refuses to reveal her full signature to
Bob or sends an invalid full signature, Bob can ask the arbitrator to convert Alice’s
partial signature into her full signature. And in case Bob’s full signature is invalid,
Alice does not need to worry about her giving away partial signature since, without
the arbitrator’s help, Bob cannot extract the full signature from the corresponding
partial signature.
A conventional way to produce such a partial signature is verifiably encrypted
signature (VES) which was first formalised by Boneh et al. in [BGLS03]. A VES
usually consists of at least two parts: one is a conventional signature encrypted
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under a TTP’s public key; the other is a zero-knowledge proof for verifiers to check
whether the encrypted signature corresponds to the conventional signature. In the
OFE protocols based on VES [ASW98, CD00], the TTP in VES can serve as the
arbitrator in OFE. If no misbehavior happens, the TTP does not involve in the
protocol. However, if Bob does not receive the valid full signature from Alice at the
end of the protocol, he can ask the arbitrator to decrypt Alice’s partial signature in
the dispute resolution protocol. The main drawback of this approach is that generating a VES from an ordinary signature is difficult for many signature schemes since
the verifiable zero-knowledge proof, which shows the validity of the encryption, is
not always achieved efficiently. In most cases, the construction of a VES has to
employ the signature schemes which have some specific mathematical structure in
order to give an efficient proof. In [Ate04], Ateniese proposed a method to construct verifiably encrypted signatures from some popular signature schemes, such as
RSA [RSA78], Cramer-Shoup [CS98], Schnorr [Sch89] and other discrete-log-type
signatures. The basic cryptographic tool in this method is to prove the equality of
discrete logarithms in one or different groups, that is, given y1 = g1x and y2 = g2x , to
prove logyg11 = logyg22 without revealing any valuable information about x. However,
such a proof can only efficiently works in the signature schemes with simple structure. For the complex signature schemes of high level security, the computation and
communication overheads of the proof are still overwhelming.
Another way to construct OFE protocols is based on sequential two-party multisignatures. In a multisignature scheme [Boy89, MOR01], multiple signers are able
to sign a single message using their own private keys, called partial private keys, together and generate many different partial signatures of their own. All these partial
private keys are used to compute a joint private key with some algebraic relation.
A multisignature, which is composed of all these partial signatures, should only be
verified by the corresponding joint public key of the joint private key. In [PCS03],
based on a RSA-based multisignature scheme, Park, Chong and Siegel proposed an
OFE protocol. In Park et al.’s protocol, the signer Alice arbitrarily splits her RSAbased private key into two partial private keys, and uses these two keys to compute
a multisignature as the full signature of OFE. Before executing the exchange protocol, Alice needs to send one of these two partial private keys to the arbitrator in
order to get a voucher which convinces the verifier Bob that the arbitrator has the
capability to compute the same multisignature with this partial private key. Then
Alice signs the message with the other partial private key and sends the verifier Bob
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this signature as the partial signature of OFE. After receiving Bob’s full signature,
Alice reveals her full multisignature to Bob. If Alice refuses to do that, Bob can ask
the arbitrator to recover the multisignature via the partial private key received for
Alice. Park et al.’s protocol is fair, optimistic, but insecure for a malicious arbitrator since there exists an efficient algorithm for the arbitrator to compute Alice’s full
private key from the partial private key with some related information. Therefore,
an adversarial arbitrator can easily break security against the arbitrator in this OFE
protocol, i.e., the arbitrator can forge a valid full signature of the signer via the signer’s private key. To solve this problem, in [DR03], Dodis and Reyzin followed Park et
al.’s idea to propose an efficient OFE scheme based on Boldyreva’s non-interactive
two-signature [Bol03], and the scheme can be formally proven secure in the random
oracle model.
In [ASW98], Asokan, Shoup and Waidner first formalised the notion of optimistic
fair exchange and proposed a concrete protocol which not only satisfies optimism
but also timely-termination and accountability. Timely-termination means, during
the execution of the protocol, if a party is in a unresponsive situation for a long time,
the other party can ask the arbitrator to stop the protocol without the permission of
the unresponsive party, i.e., any party in this protocol can always achieve a timely
and fair termination. Accountability guarantees that, if the arbitrator cheats, its
misbehavior can be detected and proved. The aim of this property is to supervise
and enforce the arbitrator to behave honestly.
In [DR03], Dodis and Reyzin proposed the notion of verifiably committed signatures which can be used to formalise non-interactive optimistic fair exchange.
According to the three different roles in OFE, the security model of verifiably committed signatures is defined in three aspects, i.e. security against the signer, the
verifier and the arbitrator. Security against the signer requires that any signer cannot generate a partial signature, which can be accepted by the honest verifier, but
cannot be converted to a valid full signature by an honest arbitrator. Security against the verifier guarantees that any verifier cannot recover a valid full signature
from the corresponding partial signature without assistance of the signer or the
arbitrator. Security against the arbitrator means that any arbitrator cannot forge
a valid full signature without asking the signer to issue one. Dodis and Reyzin’s
security model generalises the fundamental security notions in OFE, which makes
the security of OFE protocols can be rigorously proven in a formal model. In addition, this security model can be easily updated for other security notions, such as
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abuse-freeness, security in multi-user setting and chosen-key model.
Note that the security model of Dodis and Reyzin’s OFE is only defined in the
single-user setting, i.e., an OFE protocol only has one single signer, one single verifier
and one arbitrator. In [DLY07], Dodis, Lee and Yum updated the previous model
and first formally defined OFE in the multi-user setting. Different from OFE in
the single-user setting, OFE in the multi-user setting has many distinct signers and
verifiers so that a malicious party can attack the OFE protocol by colluding with
other parties. Although the security of public key encryption and digital signature
schemes in the single-user setting can imply the security in the multi-user setting.
Dodis et al. proved such implication does not always exist in OFE and presented a
counterexample. Then they defined a formal security model of OFE in the multiuser setting and proposed a generic scheme which is setup-free [ZB06] (i.e., there is
no initial-key-setup protocol between the signer and the arbitrator except necessary
verification of their public keys’ certificates). Furthermore, they proved the abstract
schemes of OFE based on verifiably encrypted signatures or sequential two-party
multisignatures still secure in the multi-user setting if the underlying primitives
satisfy some security properties, such as existential unforgeability under adaptive
chosen message attacks and indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacks.
In [HYWS08b], Huang et al. updated Dodis, Lee and Yum’s security model and
considered OFE not only in the multi-user setting but also in the chosen-key model.
Before this study, all the OFE protocols are only proven secure in the certified-key
model, in which the adversary must prove that he/she knows the corresponding
secret key before using a public key. Therefore, the adversary can only query the oracles using certified keys. However, in the chosen-key model, without this restriction
the adversary can arbitrarily select public keys without knowing the corresponding
secret keys and query the oracles using any keys he/she chooses. Huang et al. presented an attack against WVES-based OFE [LOS+ 06] under the chosen-key model
to break security against verifiers. This attack proves that security in the certifiedkey model might not imply that in the chosen-key model. After formally defining
OFE in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model, Huang et al. constructed a
generic OFE scheme which can be proven secure without random oracles. A novel
feature of this construction is that the generation of a partial signature does not
require the arbitrator’s public key. A conventional signature is used as a partial
signature, and a full signature consists of the conventional signature and a ring
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signature generated under the signer and the arbitrator’s keys. In the resolution
protocol, the arbitrator can produce such a ring signature using its own private key
on behalf of the signer.

1.3

Challenging Issues

In previous studies, most of fair exchange protocol do not satisfy the property abusefreeness which is an important security requirement for some applications (e.g. contract signing). Intuitively, a fair exchange protocol is said to be abuse-free, if any
intermediate outputs in such a protocol cannot be accepted as the valid evidence
showing that some party has committed to sign the message before the protocol successfully runs. In contrast, an OFE protocol without abuse-freeness might benefit
a dishonest party via revealing the public verifiable interim outputs to an outsider
of the protocol. For example, a customer Alice wants to buy some products from
a merchant Carl, but the price of Carl’s products is a little higher than Alice’s expectation. Another merchant Bob has the same type of products with a lower price
but the quality of the products does not meet Alice’s requirement. To get more
advantages, Alice first pretends to sign a contract with Bob. After getting the valid
verifiable interim results, she terminates the contract signing protocol with Bob, and
shows the results to Carl for reducing his price. Due to the risk of losing customers,
Carl may make concessions to Alice about the price. Obviously the contract signing
protocol between Alice and Bob is not favorable to Bob as he is just exploited by
Alice for getting a better contract.
To solve this dilemma, Garay, Jakobsson and MacKenzie [GJM99] constructed
the first abuse-free optimistic contract signing protocol from designated verifier proofs [SKM03, HSMW06], in which only a designated verifier can be convinced. Then
Wang [Wan10] proposed an abuse-free contract-signing protocol based on the RSA
signature. In Wang’s scheme, an interactive protocol based on trapdoor commitment schemes is employed to prove the validity of a RSA-based undeniable signature
[GRK00]. The main shortcoming of these two studies of abuse-freeness is no precise and formal security model is given on this topic, therefore, both the protocols
are not formally proven secure. In [HYWS08a], Huang et al. proposed the notion
of ambiguous optimistic fair exchange, in which an outsider cannot tell whether a
signer or a verifier has issued a given partial signature, i.e., the partial signature
is indistinguishable with respect to its issuer so that the verifier cannot convince
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an outsider about the authorship of the partial signature. However, Huang et al.’s
scheme is not perfectly abuse-free since an outsider can be certain of that the real
producer of the partial signature must be either the signer or the verifier, which
makes the outsider convinced by a dishonest verifier with probability at least 1/2.
In some cases, the anonymity of participants might be important in order to
protect participants’ privacy. For example, the personal preferences of negotiators
in business contract signing usually influence the terms of the final agreement. If a
trading company A has the contract signing records of an employee as a negotiator
in another company B which is a potential trade cooperator of A, A can use these
records to deduce the negotiator’s trading habits, by which Company A might get
advantages in the future contract negotiation with Company B. Hence it is desirable
that the employees who have the right to independently sign a contract on behalf of
their own company can sign contracts anonymously, which will prevent other companies from knowing the signer’s trading habits. To this end, ring signatures are the
good primitive to provide the property signer ambiguity [AOS02]. Informally, in a
ring signature scheme, the public keys of a group of users are collected spontaneously
to form a public-key list. When a signer signs a message on behalf of such a ring, he
uses the public-key list and adds his own private key as a glue value to issue a ring
signature. A verifier cannot tell who the real signer is, because the ring signature
is validated using all the public keys of the ring without revealing any information
about who produced it. On this issue, none of the previous OFE solutions formally
studies optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (OFERS) and especially analyses
its security in a high level security model. In addition, no efficient OFE protocol is
known to achieve abuse-free OFERS with provable security.

1.4

Contributions

For the sake of privacy in fair exchange, we aim to construct an efficient optimistic
fair exchange protocol of ring signatures, which not only achieves high level security
but also can be easily converted to an efficient abuse-free OFE protocol. In this
thesis, we make the following contributions.
• We propose the notion of optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (OFERS) which allows two members from two different groups exchange their ring
signatures in an equitable way with ambiguous signers for the other group.
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Then we formalize optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures and propose a
strong security model in the multi-user setting under adaptive chosen message,
chosen-key, and chosen public-key attacks.
• By combining the technologies of ring signatures, zero-knowledge proof and
public-key encryption, we construct the first efficient and concrete OFERS
scheme from verifiably encrypted ring signatures (VERS) based on Abe et
al.’s all discrete-log ring signature scheme, and formally prove that the proposed OFERS scheme is secure against signers, verifiers and the arbitrator
and perfectly inherits the property signer ambiguity of ring signatures.
• We propose the notion of abuse-free optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures
(AOFERS), in which any interim output in an OFERS protocol cannot be
accepted as the valid evidence showing that certain participant has committed
to sign the message before the protocol is executed successfully. We propose
the first formal security definition and model of AOFERS and construct an
efficient concrete AOFERS scheme based on Abe et al.’s ring signature scheme
in all discrete-log case via updating our construction of OFERS.
• We find a solution to improve the proposed AOFERS scheme such that not
only the all discrete-log ring signature scheme but also the generic scheme of
Abe et al.’s ring signatures can be efficiently employed in our AOFERS scheme,
and prove that the proposed AOFERS schemes are perfectly abuse-free in our
security model.

1.5

Organization of the Thesis

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, some background knowledge of cryptography is introduced to
help readers understand the thesis. After presenting some basic preliminaries including cryptographic hash functions, standard model, random oracle model and
some complexity assumptions, we introduce the underlying knowledge of the technologies which are applied in optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures, such as
zero-knowledge proof, public-key encryption, ring signatures, verifiably encrypted
signatures and commitment schemes.
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In Chapter 3, we present the first solution of OFERS by first formally defining its
security model in the multi-user setting under adaptive chosen message, chosen-key,
and chosen public-key attacks. Then we present a concrete OFERS scheme which is
constructed from verifiably encrypted ring signatures (VERS), and formally prove
the proposed scheme secure in our security model. At last, we point out some further
improvements of our OFERS scheme.
In Chapter 4, we improve the proposed OFERS scheme in Chapter 3 so as
to meet the property abuse-freeness. We first propose the formal definition and
security model of abuse-free optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (AOFERS),
and then construct a concrete AOFERS scheme by updating our OFERS scheme
based on Abe et al.’s all discrete-log ring signature scheme in Chapter 3. Moreover,
we extend the proposed AOFERS scheme such that the generic scheme of Abe et
al.’s ring signatures can also be efficiently employed in our construction. Lastly, we
prove that the proposed schemes is perfectly abuse-free.
Finally, the thesis is concluded in Chapter 5.

Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, some background knowledge of cryptography is briefly introduced
to help readers get a better understanding of this thesis.

2.1

Cryptographic Hash Functions

In cryptography, a hash function is a mathematical function which takes an arbitrary
length block of data as input and outputs a fixed-size bit string called a hash value.
A hash function is typically described by a mapping H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n , where
n denotes the size of a hash value. There are many practical applications of cryptographic hash functions in digital signatures, message authentication codes and so
on, where the most fundamental application of secure hash functions is verification
of message integrity. In most digital signature schemes, for the sake of security and
efficiency, only the hash value of a given message is signed instead of the original
message.
In [RS04], Rogaway and Shrimpton proposed the security properties for cryptographic hash functions, i.e., preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance and
collision resistance, and discussed the relations among these properties. Intuitively,
the security properties of a hash function can be described in the following way:
• Preimage resistance: For any hash value h, it should be computationally
difficult to find an input message m such that H(m) = h, that is, there does
not exist an efficient inverse function of H to compute the pre-image of h.
This property is usually related to the concept of a one-way function.
• Second-preimage resistance: For any input message m1 , it should be computationally difficult to find a distinct input message m2 such that H(m1 ) =
H(m2 ). This property is sometimes called weak collision resistance [NY89].
11
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• Collision resistance: It should be computationally difficult to find two distinct input messages m1 and m2 such that H(m1 ) = H(m2 ). This property is
sometimes called strong collision resistance [Dam87].
There are many practical hash functions [Riv92, KR00, AdM04] applied in different fields of cryptography. One of the most widely used hash functions is MD5
[Riv92], however, which has been considered cryptographically broken in recent study. A more secure hash function MD6 [RAB+ 08] has been therefore proposed to
replace MD5 in 2008.

2.2

Standard Model and Random Oracle Model

In cryptography, the security of cryptographic primitives (e.g. digital signature or
encryption scheme) usually depends on some complexity assumptions, such as discrete logarithm assumption and strong RSA assumption. A complexity assumption
usually describes a problem which is difficult to be solved in polynomial time. If a
cryptographic scheme is proven secure only based on such complexity assumptions,
the scheme is said to be secure in the standard model.
Standard model is a strong model in security proofs of cryptographic schemes.
However, some proofs are very hard to be found in the standard model and can
only be achieved in some idealized models [CPS08]. To this end, Bellare and Rogaway introduced random oracle model for security proofs in [BR93]. In random
oracle model, a cryptographic hash function is considered as a random oracle which
answers each query with a random response from a particular domain, and returns
the same response for the same query. In another way, if a cryptographic scheme
is proven secure in random oracle model, the adversary is not only restricted by
his computational power but also cannot require impossible abilities from the oracle
except common queries. Random oracle model is weaker than standard model in
security proofs since there does not exist a real hash function which can implement
a true random oracle in practice. Hence some cryptographic schemes, which are
proven secure in random oracle model, might be insecure in the standard model.

2.3. Computational Complexity Assumptions
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Computational Complexity Assumptions

In cryptography, a computational complexity assumption assumes a hard problem
which cannot be solved in polynomial time [Mao03]. In practice, most cryptographic primitives with provable security depends on some computational complexity
assumptions since the absolute security in information theory cannot be achieved in
many cases. Hence, in these cryptographic schemes, the adversary’s computational
ability must be restricted in polynomial time and cannot solve the hard problem
out of this limitation as the real attackers do in practice. In this section, we present
some widely used computational complexity assumptions which are referred in this
thesis.

2.3.1

Discrete Logarithm Assumption

The discrete logarithm assumption is the most fundamental computational complexity assumption in cryptography. The concept of discrete logarithms is proposed
in abstract algebra as analogues of ordinary logarithms in real or complex numbers.
Roughly, the discrete logarithm assumption is that, given a finite cyclic group G
and its elements g and h, it is difficult to find a solution x in G such that h = g x ,
where x is called a discrete logarithm to the base g of h in G. Formally, the discrete
logarithm assumption is defined by Mao [Mao03] as follow:
Definition 2.1 Let F∗q be a finite cycle group with the order q, g is a generater
element of F∗q and h ∈ F∗q . a is the unique integer a < q such that h = g a . A
discrete logarithm solver is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A with
an advantage  = Pr[a ← A(g, h)] > 0. Let IG be an instance generator that on
input 1k , runs in time polynomial in k, and outputs F∗q , g and h. We say that IG
satisfies the discrete logarithm assumption if there exists no discrete logarithm solver
for IG(1k ) with an advantage  > 0 non-negligible in k for all sufficiently large k.

2.3.2

Strong RSA Assumption

The strong RSA assumption is usually used in security proofs of cryptographic
primitives such as [BP97, FO97]. Based on the strong RSA assumption, some digital
signature schemes, such as [GHR99, CS00], can be proven secure without random
oracles. Informally, the strong RSA assumption assumes a hard problem that, given
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a RSA modulus n and a random integer y ∈ Z∗n , it is hard to find integers x and e
such that y = xe mod n and 1 < e ≤ n. Formally, the strong RSA assumption is
defined as follow [BP97]:
Definition 2.2 Let RSAM od () denote the set of RSA moduli of length k. For any
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A and any sufficiently large integer k,
Pr = [(x, e) ← A(n, y) ∧ y = xe mod n ∧ n ∈R RSAM od (k)
∧ y ∈R Z∗n ∧ 1 < e ≤ n] = negl(k)
In this thesis, Camenisch and Michels’ zero-knowledge proof [CM99] is employed
for verifying the validity of partial ring signatures in our fair exchange schemes. The
security of the zero-knowledge proof is based on the strong RSA assumption.

2.3.3

Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption

The decisional composite residuosity assumption (DCRA) is first proposed by Pascal
Paillier [Pai99] for the proof of Paillier cryptosystem. The definition of DCRA is
given in [Pai99] as follow:
Definition 2.3 A number z is said to be a n−th residue modulo n2 if there exists
a number y ∈ Z∗n2 such that z = y n mod n2 . CR[n] denotes distinguishing n−th
residues from non n−th residues. There exists no polynomial time distinguisher for
n−th residues modulo n2 , i.e., CR[n] is intractable.
In this thesis, in order to provide the high level security which protects against
adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA2), we choose Camenisch and Shoup’s public key encryption scheme in our fair exchange schemes, which is an adaptation of
Paillier cryptosystem. Like Paillier cryptosystem, the security of Camenisch and
Shoup’s encryption scheme also relies on the decisional composite residuosity assumption.

2.4

Zero-knowledge Proof

The concept of zero-knowledge proof is first proposed by Goldwasser et al. [GMR89].
A zero-knowledge proof is a proof of the truth of a statement, which allows a prover
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to convince a verifier without revealing anything else. By this proof, the verifier is successfully convinced that the prover does know something, but no more
information is provided. Typically, it is used for one party to convince another
party that the first party knows some secret but does not want the second party to learn anything about this secret. For this reason, zero-knowledge proofs are
widely used in many fields of cryptography, such as fair exchange protocols in ecommerce [PCS03], authentication systems [BM93] and secure multiparty computation [CDD+ 99, IKOS09].
Generally, an interactive zero-knowledge proof system must satisfy three properties: correctness, soundness and zero-knowledge. Following Bellare and Goldreich’s
definitions in [BG06], we describe a zero-knowledge proof system in the following
way:
Definition 2.4 An interactive zero-knowledge proof system (P,V) for a set S is
a two party game between a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) prover P and a
PPT verifier V , and satisfies the following properties:
• Correctness: For any x ∈ S, the verifier V always accepts after the proof with
the prover P on common input x, i.e., if a statement is true, the prover always
succeeds to convince the verifier via such a proof.
• Soundness: For any x ∈
/ S, the verifier V rejects with probability at least 1/2
after the proof with the prover P on common input x, i.e., if a statement is not
true, the verifier V can not be convinced by the prover P except with some
small probability.
• Zero-knowledge: There exists an expected probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A∗ . For any x ∈ S, (P, V)(x) and A∗ (x) are computationally indistinguishable, that is, the distribution of the outputs of (P, V)(x) and A∗ (x) are
identical. If a statement is true, the verifier cannot learn anything other than
the fact of the statement.

2.4.1

Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Proof

In [BFM88], Blum, Feldman and Micali proposed a method to achieve non-interactive
zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs without interaction between provers and verifiers. In
this method, a random challenge bits shared between a prover and a verifier is used
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as a common reference string to provide computational zero-knowledge. Such a
common reference string can be considered to be generated by a third party which
is mutually trusted by provers and verifiers. In practice, the common reference
string is usually produced by a trusted setup algorithm which is agreed by both the
prover and the verifier. A non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system can
be formalized as follow [GS08]:
Definition 2.5: A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for a language L
with a relation R comprises a prover P , a verifier V and a common reference string
(CRS) generation algorithm K outputting a CRS σ. ≈ denotes being equal except
negligible probability. To prove x ∈ L with witness w, i.e. (x, w) ∈ R, the prover
P generates a proof π ← P (σ, x, w) and sends it to the verifier. Then on input
(σ, x, π), the verifier V checks whether the proof is valid, if yes, outputs 1, otherwise
outputs 0. This proof system satisfies the following conditions:
• Completeness: For any adversary A,
Pr[σ ← K(1k ); (x, w) ← A(σ); π ← P (σ, x, w) : V (σ, x, π) = 1 if (x, w) ∈ R] ≈ 1.
• Soundness: For any adversary A,
Pr[σ ← K(1k ); (x, π) ← A(σ) : V (σ, x, π) = 0 if x ∈
/ L] ≈ 1.
• Zero-knowledge: There exists a simulator Sim = (Sim1 , Sim2 ). On input
1k , Sim1 outputs a simulated CRS and its corresponding trapdoor τ , where
the simulated CRS is indistinguishable from a real one. Sim2 takes as input
(σ, τ, x) and outputs a simulated proof which is indistinguishable from that
generated by a real prover. For any adversary A,
Pr[σ ← K(1k ) : AP (σ,.,.) (σ) = 1] ≈ P r[(σ, τ ) ← Sim1 (1k ) : ASim(σ,τ,.,.) = 1],
where Sim(σ, τ, x, w) = Sim2 (σ, τ, x).
In our optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures scheme (Chapter 3), the verification of a partial ring signature is based on a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
which is updated from Camenisch and Michels’ zero-knowledge proof [CM99]. In
our abuse-free OFERS scheme (Chapter 4), the non-interactive proof is modified
again to a new interactive zero-knowledge proof in order to achieve the property
abuse-freeness.

2.5. Public-key Encryption
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Public-key Encryption

In symmetric cryptosystems, a secret key is involved in both encryption and decryption algorithms, which leads a difficulty in the distribution of keys, i.e., how
to guarantee the security of such a secret key during the exchange of encrypted
messages. To solve this dilemma, the concept of public-key cryptosystems was first
proposed by Diffie and Hellman [DH76a] in 1976. In public-key cryptosystems, the
encryption key and the decryption key are distinct. When a user generates a publicprivate key-pair, he/she only keeps the private key as a secret and sends the public
key to an authentication server which is in charge of the key distribution. Typically,
the construction of a public-key encryption scheme is based on a one-way trapdoor
function which can be defined as follow [Mao03]:
Definition 2.6: A one-way trapdoor function denoted by ft (x) : D → R is a oneway function, i.e., it is easy to evaluate for all x ∈ D and difficult to invert for almost
all values in R. However, if the trapdoor information t is used, for all values y ∈ R,
it is easy to compute x ∈ D such that y = ft (x).
The security of public-key cryptosystems is usually based on some computational
complexity assumptions, i.e., the computational capabilities of the attacker for such a
cryptosystem is limited in polynomial time. However, with the development of highperformance computers, especially quantum computers, some of the most popular
public-key cryptsystems, such as RSA [RSA78], ElGamal [ElG85] and Paillier [Pai99]
cryptosystems, may not be secure anymore and replaced by some new cryptosystems
with high level security.

2.5.1

Security Notions

In order to analyze the security of an encryption scheme, the possible aims and
attack models should be first defined. The security notions of public-key encryption
schemes are therefore categorized according to this way.
The attack models against an encryption scheme usually fall into three patterns
in order of increasing capability of attackers: chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), nonadaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA1) [NY90] and adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attack (CCA2) [RS91]. Chosen-plaintext attacks are the most fundamental attack
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model, in which the adversary can arbitrarily choose plaintexts and get its corresponding ciphertexts. And in CCA1, the adversary not only has the public key but
also is allowed to access a decryption oracle under the corresponding private key
to decrypt any ciphertext of his choice. However, once the challenge ciphertext is
given to the adversary, the decryption oracle cannot be accessed anymore. Moreover, in CCA2, the adversary’s power is further strengthened. He/She can access
the decryption oracle all the time even after obtaining the challenge ciphertext. The
only limitation for the adversary is that he/she cannot ask the decryption oracle to
decrypt the challenge ciphertext.
In addition, there are another two important security properties desired in encryption schemes: indistinguishability [GM84] and non-malleability [DDN91]. Indistinguishability means that, given two messages x0 , x1 of equal length and a ciphertext
cb of either x0 or x1 , the adversary cannot indicate the plaintext of cb from x0 and
x1 , that is, the adversary cannot learn anything about the plaintext from the corresponding ciphertext. Non-malleability means, given a ciphertext c, the adversary
cannot output a distinct ciphertext c0 such that the plaintexts x0 and x1 of these
two ciphertexts have some relation in mathematical structure.
The three attack models and the two security properties can be formed to six
security notions, i.e., IND-CPA, IND-CCA1, IND-CCA2, NM-CPA, NM-CCA1 and
NM-CCA2. In [BDPR98], Bellare et al. studied the relations among these security
notions for public-key encryption schemes. Their achievement is summarized in the
following figure:

Figure 2.1: [BDPR98] The relations of security notions for public-key encryption
schemes

In Figure 2.1, for any security notion A, B ∈ {IND-CPA, IND-CCA1, INDCCA2, NM-CPA, NM-CCA1, NM-CCA2}, A → B means, if an encryption scheme
satisfies the notion A, then it also provably satisfies the notion B, and A 9 B
means, if an encryption scheme satisfies the notion A but it is proved not to satisfy
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the notion B. From this figure, we can see that the notion of non-malleability always
implies the notion of indistinguishability, but the reverse does not exist except the
CCA2 case, in which non-malleability is equivalent to indistinguishability. And
CCA2 is the strongest notion since the power of adversaries is the least limited in
CCA2.
In this thesis, in order to achieve the high level security, we choose Camenisch
and Shoup’s encryption scheme [CS03], which is proven secure against adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attacks, as our encryption scheme for the generation of verifiably
encrypted ring signatures.

2.6

Digital Signatures

The concept of digital signatures was first described by Diffie and Hellman in
[DH76b]. A digital signature scheme [Sch89, CA89, BLS04] is a mathematical
method for proving the authorship of a digital message by a one-way trapdoor
function. Intuitively, a digital signature scheme is a variant of public-key encryption
schemes. When a user of a public-private key-pair issues a digital signature on a
message, he/she ‘encrypts’ the message using his/her private key, and the ‘encrypted’ message can be ‘decrypted’ by anyone using the user’s public key. Because only
the user has the right to access his/her private key, such an ‘encrypted message’ can
only be created by the user as his/her digital signature.
Definition 2.7: A conventional digital signature scheme consists of three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms.
• KeyGen: On input a security parameter, the key generation algorithm outputs a verifying-signing key-pair (vk, sk) for a user.
• Sign: On input a digital message m and a signing key sk, the signing algorithm
outputs a signature σ on m.
• Veri: On input a signature σ, a message m and a verifying key vk, the verification algorithm outputs 1 or 0, which means whether σ is a valid signature
on m under vk, or not respectively.
In this thesis, we consider the digital signature schemes referred in our fair exchange protocols in a strong security notion, i.e. existential unforgeability against
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adaptive chosen-message attacks [GMR88], which means an attacker can obtain the
signature of any message of his/her choice, but the probability of forging a signature
for a challenge message without the signing oracle is negligible.

2.6.1

Ring Signatures

A ring signature [AOS02, LSW06, CWLY06], sometimes referred as 1-out-of-n signature, is a special digital signature with an additional property signer ambiguity,
which was first introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman in [RST01]. Informally,
in a ring signature scheme, the public keys of a group of users are collected spontaneously to form a public-key list. When a signer signs a message on behalf of such
a ring, he uses the public-key list and adds his own private key as a glue value to
issue a ring signature. A verifier cannot tell who the real signer is, because the ring
signature is validated using all the public keys of the ring without revealing any
information about who produced it. The definition of 1-out-of-n signature can be
described as follow [AOS02]:
Definition 2.8: A 1-out-of-n signature scheme S 1,n consists of three probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms.
• G 1,n (1k ): On input a security parameter k, the key generation algorithm outputs a public-private key-pair (vk, sk) for each user.
1,n
• Ssk
: On input a message m and a public-key list L including the public key

which corresponds to sk, the signing algorithm outputs a signature σ on m
under L.
• VL1,n : On input a signature σ, a message m and a public-key list L, the verification algorithm outputs 1 or 0, which respectively means to accept or reject
σ as a valid signature on m under L.
Definition 2.9 (Signer Ambiguity): L = {vk1 , ..., vkn } is a pubic-key list, in
which each key is generated by (vki , ski ) ← G 1,n (1ki ). A 1-out-of-n signature scheme
S 1,n is said to be perfectly signer-ambiguous if, for any L, any message m and any
1,n
signature σ generated by σ ← Ssk
(m, L) where sk ∈ {sk1 , ..., skn }, given (L, m, σ),

any unbound adversary A outputs i such that sk = ski with exactly probability
1/|L|.
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In our optimistic fair exchange of ring signature schemes, we choose Abe et al.’s
ring signature schemes which are proven perfectly signer-ambiguous and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message and chosen public-key attacks
[AOS02].

2.6.2

Verifiably Encrypted Signature

In practice, an effective way to construct optimistic fair exchange protocols is verifiably encrypted signature (VES) [ZSNS03, GS05, ZM07, ZWQ09, RSS10], which
was formally defined by Boneh et al. [BGLS03]. A VES is an ordinary signature
encrypted using the public key of a trusted third party, together with a verifiable
proof showing the validity of the encryption. In OFE protocols, a VES is usually
used as a partial signature that is the commitment for the corresponding full signature.
Definition 2.10: A verifiably encrypted signature scheme consists of seven probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms.
• KeyGen, Signing, Verification: These three algorithms are the same as
that in conventional signature schemes.
• AdjKeyGen: On input a security parameter, the algorithm outputs a publicprivate key-pair (AP K, ASK) for an adjudicator.
• VESsig: On input a message m, a private key sk and an adjudicator’s public
key AP K, the algorithm outputs a VES θ on m under pk.
• VESver: On input a VES θ, a message m, a public key pk and an adjudicator’s
public key AP K, the algorithm outputs 1 or 0, which respectively means to
accept or reject θ as a valid VES on m under pk.
• Adjudication: On input an adjudicator’s key-pair (AP K, ASK) and a VES
θ on a message m under a public key pk, the algorithm outputs a conventional
signature σ on m under pk.
In an OFE protocol base on VES, Alice can first send a VES generated under
a TTP’s public key to Bob. Then, Bob is able to verify the validity of the VES
together with a proof showing that Alice’s signature encrypted in the VES can be
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recovered by the TTP as the arbitrator, but cannot obtain the original signature
from Alice unless Bob sends his own signature to Alice. After that, if Alice refuses to
reveal Bob her signature, Bob can ask the TTP to decrypt Alice’s VES and obtain
her original signature.

2.7

Commitment Schemes

In cryptography, a commitment scheme is an important tool for designing cryptographic protocols. The notion of commitments schemes was first formally defined by Brassard, Chaum and Crépeau in [BCC88]. Informally speaking, when
a two-party protocol runs between a sender and a receiver, a commitment scheme
[BCC88, Ped91, ZCDM09] allows the sender to commit a value hidden in a commitment which will be opened by the sender revealing the hidden value and some
related information later, so that the receiver can check whether the hidden value
is committed correctly in advance. A commitment scheme satisfies two properties
hiding and binding: hiding means no one can know what value is committed in a
given commitment except its producer, and binding guarantees that, once a commitment has been made, the committed value in the given commitment cannot be
changed by anyone.

2.7.1

Trapdoor Commitment Schemes

A trapdoor commitment scheme is a variant of common commitment schemes, which
is mostly used for designing zero-knowledge proofs. Beside the properties hiding and
binding, in a trapdoor commitment scheme [Gen04, MY04, SST05], there exists a
secret trapdoor, by which a commitment can be opened ambiguously with different
answers, but without the trapdoor, the property binding still holds. A trapdoor
commitment scheme can be defined as follow:
Definition 2.11: A trapdoor commitment scheme consists of four probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms.
• TCsetup: On input a security parameter, the algorithm outputs a trapdoor
td and its corresponding public key pk.
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• TCcomit: On input a value m and a public key pk, the committing algorithm
outputs a commitment σ for m with a random value r.
• TCveri: On input a value m, a public key pk, a trapdoor commitment σ
and its related value r, the verification algorithm outputs 1 or 0, which means
whether (m, r) is a valid answer to σ under pk, or not respectively.
• TCsim: On input a trapdoor td and a trapdoor commitment σ with a valid
answer (m, r), the simulation algorithm outputs a distinct answer (m0 , r0 ) for
σ, where (m0 , r0 ) 6= (m, r).
In our abuse-free optimistic fair exchange of ring signature scheme, to verify the
validity of an encrypted ring signature, we use an interactive zero-knowledge proof
based on trapdoor commitment schemes since such a proof is secure against the
on-line attack for abuse-freeness introduced by Wang [Wan10] (see Chapter 4 for
details).

Chapter 3
Optimistic Fair Exchange of Ring
Signatures
In this chapter, the notion of optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (OFERS)
is first described in formal security model. After introducing the building blocks, a
concrete OFERS scheme is presented based on the technology of verifiably encrypted
ring signatures (VERS). And the formal proofs are given to show that the concrete
scheme is secure in our security model.

3.1

Introduction

After the concept of optimistic fair exchange (OFE) was first proposed by Asokan
et al. [ASW97] in 1997, fair exchange protocols are usually executed between individual parties. When two members on behalf of two different groups intend to fairly
exchange their digital items in networks, the privacy of the participants should be
carefully considered in some cases. Hence it is desirable that the parties in fair exchange of digital signatures, who have the right to sign a message on behalf of their
own group, can sign messages anonymously. For this reason, we study optimistic
fair exchange of ring signatures (OFERS), in which users in each ring can fairly exchange their ring signatures with ambiguous signers for the other ring. By inheriting
the property signer ambiguity of ring signatures, the real signers in OFERS can be
perfectly hidden in their own ring without revealing who signs the message. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first formal work on this topic to present a formal
security model of OFERS and a concrete solution with provable security.
After introducing the building blocks in our construction of OFERS in Section
3.2, we first rigorously define the security model of OFERS in the multi-user setting
under adaptive chosen message, chosen-key and chosen public-key attacks (Section
3.3). This is done by updating the formal models of OFE [DLY07, HYWS08b]
24
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in the scenario of ring signatures. Then we present a concrete OFERS scheme
(Section 3.4), which is constructed from verifiably encrypted ring signatures (VERS)
based on Abe et al.’s all discrete-log ring signatures [AOS02] under an arbitrator’s
public key, together with a proof of knowledge showing the validity of the original
ring signature’s encryption. Theoretically, any CCA2-secure public key encryption
scheme can be used as such a proof of knowledge always exists (but may be not
efficient). To provide practicality and high efficiency, Camenisch and Shoup’s CCA2secure encryption scheme [CS03] is particularly selected in the proposed scheme.
Then, we formally show that the proposed OFERS solution is provably secure in
our security model (Section 3.5).
As the VES technique is employed, a notable feature of our scheme is that any
holder (not necessarily the signer) of a valid ring signature can verifiably encrypt
the ring signature to get a VERS without using any secret information from the
signer. Due to this feature, our scheme not only preserves the property signer
ambiguity [AOS02] of ring signatures, but also allows a signer to delegate a proxy
(e.g. his/her secretary) to run OFERS after he/she produced a ring signature in
advance. Moreover, the proposed OFERS scheme can be easily updated to an abusefree OFERS scheme by applying an interactive zero-knowledge proof showing the
validity of verifiably encrypted ring signatures. And not only the all discrete-log
ring signature scheme but also Abe et al.’s generic ring signature scheme can be
applied in the abuse-free OFERS scheme. The details of this part will be shown in
Chapter 4.

3.2

Building Blocks

In this section, we introduce the concrete building blocks in our OFERS scheme.

3.2.1

Abe et al.’s Ring Signature Schemes

For the sake of simplicity and efficiency in mathematical structure, we choose Abe et
al.’s ring signature schemes in our OFERS scheme. In [AOS02], Abe et al. proposed
a generic scheme of ring signatures and some concrete examples which are proved unconditionally signer-ambiguous and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message and chosen public-key attacks.
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Generic Scheme
Abe et al. first described two types of signature schemes, called Hash-then-One-Way
type (type-H) and Three-move type (type-T), which can be used in their generic
scheme of ring signatures. Type-H signature schemes, such as RSA signature, typically consist of a trapdoor one-way function F , its inverse function I and a hash
function H. For any c from an appropriate message domain, computing c = Fvk (s)
is easy but computing any preimage of s is hard in polynomial-time, where vk is the
verification key. But by using the trapdoor key sk, anyone can compute s = Isk (c)
sig
efficiently. A type-H signature is σ ← Ssk
(m) = (s, aux), where s = Isk (H(m, aux))

and aux is the optional auxiliary information. In the verification algorithm, the sig?

nature σ is verified by checking whether H(m, aux) = Fvk (s).
Type-T signature schemes, such as Schnorr signature, are based on three-move
honest verifier zero-knowledge proofs. The signing algorithm involves three functions
denoted by A, Z and H, where A generates the commitment a using the signer’s
secret key sk and a randomness r, H is a hash function to generate a challenge
c from the message m and the commitment a, and Z generates an answer s to
the challenge c. V is a verifying algorithm of a zero-knowledge proof showing the
relation between a and s, c. On input s, c and the signer’s verification key vk, V
outputs z which is supposed to equal a. In the type-T signature schemes, the signer
computes the commitment a ← A(sk; r), the challenge c = H(m, a) and the response
s = Z(sk, r, c) in sequence. The resulting signature is σ = (s, c). In the verification
?

algorithm, σ is verified by checking whether c = H(m, z), where z = V (s, c, vk).
In Abe et al.’s generic scheme of ring signatures, users in a ring can generate
their own secret-verification key pairs (sk, vk) from any type-H or type-T signature
schemes. Let L = {vk0 , ..., vkn−1 }. A signer with the secret key skk generates a ring
signature on a message m under L as follow:
1. (Initialization): Compute

Ak (skk ; α) , (type-T), or
ek =
β
, (type-H),
where α is randomly selected from the space of the randomness r defined by
the algorithm Ak (skk ; r) in the type-T signature scheme, and β is randomly
selected from the space of c defined by the algorithm Iskk (c) in the type-H
signature scheme. Then compute ck+1 = Hk+1 (L, m, ek ).
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2. (Forward sequence): For i = k + 1, ..., n − 1, 0, ..., k − 1, compute

Vi (si , ci , vki )
, (type-T), or
ei =
c + F (s , vk ) , (type-H),
i

i

i

i

where si is randomly selected. Then compute ci+1 = Hi+1 (L, m, ei ).
3. (Forming the ring): Compute

Zk (skk , α, ck )
, (type-T), or
sk =
I (β − c , sk ) , (type-H).
k
k
k
The resulting ring signature is (c0 , s0 , ..., sn−1 ).
In the verification algorithm, for i = 0, ..., n − 1, compute

Vi (si , ci , vki )
, (type-T), or
ei =
c + F (s , vk ) , (type-H).
i

i

i

i

Then compute ci+1 = Hi+1 (L, m, ei ) if i 6= n − 1. If c0 = H0 (L, m, en−1 ), the verifier
accepts σ as a valid ring signature, reject otherwise.
Concrete Scheme of All Discrete-log Case
Let pi , qi be large primes, hgi i denote a prime subgroup of Z∗pi generated by gi whose
order is qi . Compute yi = gixi mod pi , where xi is the secret key and (yi , pi , qi , gi ) is
the public key. Hi : {0, 1}∗ → Zqi denotes a collision-resistant hash function. L is a
list of (yi , pi , qi , gi ), where i = 0, ..., n − 1 and n = |L|. A signer with the secret key
xk generates a ring signature on a message m under L as follows:
1. Randomly select α ∈ Zqk and compute ck+1 = Hk+1 (L, m, gkα mod pk ).
2. For i = k + 1, ..., n − 1, 0, ..., k − 1, randomly select si ∈ Zqi and compute
ci+1 = Hi+1 (L, m, gisi yici mod pi ), and then sk = α − xk ck mod qk .
3. Send the verifier (c0 , s0 , s1 , ..., sn−1 ) as the resulting ring signature on the message
m under the public-key list L.
For i = 0, ..., n − 1, the verifier computes ei = gisi yici mod pi , and then ci+1 =
Hi+1 (L, m, ei ) if i 6= n−1. The verifier accepts the ring signature if c0 = H0 (L, m, en−1 ),
otherwise rejects.
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Concrete Scheme of All RSA Case
For i = 0, ..., n − 1, let (ei , Ni ) be the RSA public key and di be the private key for
the user Ui . Hi : {0, 1}∗ → ZNi is a collision-resistant hash function. L is a list of
these public keys. A signer Uk signs a message m under L as follow:
1. Randomly select β ∈ ZNk , and compute ck+1 = Hk+1 (L, m, β).
2. For i = k + 1, . . . , n − 1, 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, randomly select si ∈ ZNi , and compute
ci+1 = Hi+1 (L, m, ci + si ei mod Ni ).
3. Compute sk = (β−ck )dk mod Nk . The resulting ring signature is σ = (c0 , s0 , . . . , sn−1 ).
For i = 0, . . . , n − 1, the verifier computes ri = ci + si ei mod Ni , then compute
ci+1 = Hi+1 (L, m, ri ) if i 6= n − 1. If c0 = H0 (L, m, rn−1 ), the verifier accepts σ as a
valid ring signature, reject otherwise.

3.2.2

Zero-knowledge Proof of Equality of Discrete Logarithms from Different Groups

In [Ate04], Ateniese introduced an underlying proof of the equality of discrete logarithms, which is used for constructing verifiably encrypted signatures. In [CM99],
Camenisch and Michels proposed a concrete scheme to prove the equality of discrete
logarithms from different groups under the strong RSA assumption. In our OFERS scheme, we modify Camenisch and Michels’ proof as our zero-knowledge proof
so as to build a verifiably encrypted signature scheme based on the all discretelog ring signature introduced above. Camenisch and Michels’ proof is denoted by
G

G

Z∗

P K{(α, β) : y1 =1 g1α ∧ y2 =2 g2α ∧ ỹ =n hβ1 hα2 ∧ (−2l < α < 2l )}. The details of the
proof are shown below:
n is the product of two sufficiently large safe primes and must be large enough to
avoid being factored. h1 and h2 are two random elements with large order from Zn .
Let G1 and G2 be two distinct groups of orders q1 and q2 such that 2l+1 < min(q1 , q2 ),
where l is an integer, and g1 and g2 are the generators of G1 and G2 respectively.
G

G

Let y1 =1 g1x and y2 =2 g2x ,  > 1 is a security parameter which controls the tightness
of the statistical zero-knowledgeness. If −2(l−2)/ < x < 2(l−2)/ , the prover can
convince the verifier that loggy11 = logyg22 in Z by the following steps:
1. The prover randomly chooses r ∈ Zn and computes ỹ = hr1 hx2 mod n, then
randomly selects r1 ∈ {−2l−2 , ..., 2l−2 } and r2 ∈ {−(n2k ) , ..., (n2k ) }, where k
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is the length of bits of the verifier’s challenge, and computes the commitments:
t1 = g1r1 , t2 = g2r1 , and t3 = hr12 hr21 . After that, the prover sends (t1 , t2 , t3 ) to
the verifier.
2. The verifier returns a random challenge c ∈ {0, 1}k .
3. The prover computes the responses s1 = r1 − cx and s2 = r2 − cr in Z, then
sends (s1 , s2 ) to the verifier.
4. The verifier accepts the proof if and only if −2l−1 < s1 < 2l−1 , t1 = g1s1 y1c ,
t2 = g2s1 y2c and t3 = hs12 hs21 ỹ c hold.
Note that the proof above is based on the strong RSA assumption. The prover
should not know the factoring of n. Hence n, h1 , h2 might be generated by the verifier or a trusted third party. Before executing the proof, the prover should check
whether n is the product of two safe primes (see [CM99] for details) and whether h1
and h2 have large order (see [GKR97] for details). To convert this interactive proof
into a signature form on a message m, the prover can use a suitable hash function
h(·), which is agreed by the verifier, to compute the hash value of all the public information instead of the verifier’s challenge c ( e.g., c = h(m||ỹ||y1 ||y2 ||g1 ||g2 ||t1 ||t2 ||t3 )
).

3.2.3

Camenisch-Shoup Encryption Scheme

In [Ate04], Ateniese proposed a method to construct verifiably encrypted signatures
by encrypting an ordinary signature using some specific public-key cryptosystems and giving a proof showing the validity of the signature’s encryption. In such
cryptosystems (e.g. Naccache-Stern [NS98], Okamoto-Uchiyama [OU98] and Paillier [Pai99] public-key cryptosystems), computing a discrete logarithm using the
secret key is an easy task, but without the secret key, it is still hard. However, all
these public-key cryptosystems above do not satisfy the high level security which
protects against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA2). In [CS03], Camenisch
and Shoup proposed an adaptation of Paillier cryptosystem, which is proven secure
against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks under the decisional composite residuosity assumption. To achieve the high level security, we use Camenisch and Shoup’s
scheme as our encryption scheme, which is briefly described as follows:
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1. Randomly select two Sophie Germain primes p0 and q 0 , where p0 6= q 0 , and
compute safe primes p = 2p0 + 1, q = 2q 0 + 1 and n = pq. Then randomly
select x1 , x2 , x3 ∈R [n2 /4]

1

and g 0 ∈ Z∗n2 , and compute g = (g 0 )2n , y1 = g x1 ,

y2 = g x2 , y3 = g x3 . Let h = (1 + n mod n2 ) ∈ Z∗n2 , abs: Z∗n2 → Z∗n2 map
(a mod n2 ), where 0 < a < n2 , to (n2 − a mod n2 ) if a > n2 /2, and to
(a mod n2 ) otherwise. Obviously for any v ∈ Z∗n2 , v 2 = (abs(v))2 holds. H is
a collision-resistant hash function. A label L is some public information added
to the ciphertext (e.g., user’s identity or expiration time). The public key is
(n, g, y1 , y2 , y3 ), and the private key is (x1 , x2 , x3 ).
2. To encrypt a message m ∈ [n] with a label L ∈ {0, 1}∗ , randomly select r ∈R
H(u,e,L) r

[n/4] and compute u = g r , e = y1r hm and v = abs((y2 y3

) ). The triple

(u, e, v) is the resulting ciphertext.
3. To decrypt a ciphertext (u, e, v), first check whether abs(v) = v and u2(x2 +H(u,e,L)x3 ) =
v2.

If fail, output reject, otherwise compute m̂ = (e/ux1 )2t , where t =

2−1 mod n. If m̂ is of the form hm for some m ∈ [n], then output m, otherwise output reject.
Recall the ring signature scheme of all discrete-log case presented in Section 3.2.1.
Suppose the signer generates a ring signature (c0 , s0 , s1 , ..., sn−1 ). In the verification
of this signature, the verifier needs to compute ei = gisi yici , where i = 0, 1, ..., n−1. In
order to convert the ring signature into a verifiably encrypted ring signature (VERS),
the signer sends the verifier wi = gisi instead of si and encrypts si using a TTP’s
public key. The verifier can do the verification by computing ei = wi yici instead,
but si is ‘hidden’ in wi since in this ring signature scheme computing a discrete
logarithm is hard, which means the verifier has not got the full ring signature yet.
Beside that, the signer needs to give a zero-knowledge proof for convincing the
verifier that the encrypted si is just the si hidden in wi . Note that encrypting
only one value in (s0 , s1 , ..., sn−1 ) can also ensure the initial ring signature hidden
partially, which means the verifier still cannot draw the full ring signature from the
partially encrypted ring signature even though he gets the most parts of the initial
ring signature. Encrypting one value makes the cost of generating a VERS does
not depend on the size of the public-key list, which improves the efficiency of the
generation of a VERS.
1

For a positive integer a, [a] denotes the set {0, 1, ..., a − 1}.

3.3. Security Definitions

31

To produce a verifiably encrypted ring signature, suppose the signer randomly chooses su , where 0 6 u 6 n − 1, from (s0 , s1 , ..., sn−1 ) as the hidden value, and encrypts su using Camenisch and Shoup’s encryption scheme above. Let
(n, g, y1 , y2 , y3 , h) be the public key of a TTP. H is a collision-resistant hash function, and L is the public label. The signer computes su ’s ciphertext u = gt , e =
H(u,e,L) t

y1 t hsu , v = abs((y2 y3

) ), where t ∈R [n/4]. After that, by modifying the

zero-knowledge proof introduced in Section 3.2.2, the signer gives a non-interactive
H(u,e,L) 2t

proof: P K{(su , t, r) : w = gusu ∧ u2 = g2t ∧ e2 = y1 2t h2su ∧ v2 = (y2 y3

) ∧ ŵ =

hr1 hs2u ∧ −2l < su < 2l } to convince the verifier that the TTP can extract su using
its secret key and recover the original ring signature completely. Note that anyone
beside the signer has the capability to convert a valid ring signature into a VERS
without knowing any secret information from the signer. The property signer ambiguity of ring signatures [AOS02] is well preserved since the hidden value can be
arbitrarily chosen in (s0 , ..., sn−1 ) and no secret of the signer is needed for producing
a VERS based on a given ring signature. In our verifiably encrypted ring signature
scheme, for the sake of simplicity, we specify sn−1 as the hidden value encrypted
using a TTP’s public key no matter who the signer is. The details are shown in
Section 3.4.

3.3

Security Definitions

In [DLY07], Dodis et al. presented a formal security model of optimistic fair exchange under adaptive chosen message attacks in a multi-user setting, in which the
optimistic fair exchange protocol can be executed between different signers and different verifiers. That is, multiple pairs of users can run the two-party fair exchange
protocol without compromising security. In the adaptive chosen message attacks
[GMR88], an adversary can access the signing oracle by asking for signatures on
arbitrary messages. In ring signatures, there are multiple users belonging to each
public-key list. So the multi-user setting is necessary for fair exchange of ring signatures. Furthermore, Huang et al. [HYWS08b] extended Dodis et al.’s model by
considering chosen-key model, i.e., an adversary may win a computational game if
it is allowed to employ some public keys without knowing the corresponding private
keys. By providing this extra flexibility, the chosen-key model is stronger than the
certified-key model [HYWS08b]. In addition, we also consider chosen public-key attacks in the setting of ring signatures, which is proposed by Abe et al. [AOS02]. In
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chosen public-key attacks, any adversary who wants to forge a ring signature is only
allowed to use arbitrary subsets of the initially considered public-key list to access
the signing oracle, but cannot append new public keys to the initial public-key list.
Therefore, in our security definitions specified below, all the four factors above are
addressed in the setting of OFERS as a whole.
Definition 3.1.

(Syntax) Optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures

(OFERS) consists of seven probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms.
• SetupTTP : On input a security parameter κ, the arbitrator executes the algorithm to generate a public-private key pair (AP K, ASK) and some auxiliary
information if necessary.
• SetupUser : On input κ and (optionally) the arbitrator’s public key with the
auxiliary information, the algorithm outputs public-private key pairs (P Ki ,
SKi ) for every user in the ring. The public keys form a public-key list L.
• RSig(m, L, SKs ): A signer Us in the ring executes the algorithm by inputting
a message m, a public-keys list L including P Ks and its corresponding private
key SKs , then outputs a ring signature σ.
• RVer(m, L, σ): On input a message m, a ring signature σ on m under a
public-key list L, a verifier executes the algorithm to output either 1 or 0, which
means accept or reject respectively.
• PRSig(m, L, σ, AP K): On input a message m, a signer’s public-key list L,
a ring signature σ on m under L, and the arbitrator’s public key AP K, the
algorithm outputs a verifiably partial ring signature θ.
• PRVer(m, L, θ, AP K): On input a message m, a signer’s public-key list L,
a verifiably partial ring signature θ on m under L, and the arbitrator’s public
key AP K, the verifier executes the algorithm to output either 1 or 0, which
means accept or reject respectively.
• Res(m, L, θ, ASK): The resolution algorithm is executed by the arbitrator
if the verifier does not receive the full ring signature σ from the signer ring,
but has got the corresponding verifiably partial ring signature θ. On input a
message m, a signer’s public-key list L and a verifiably partial ring signature
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θ on m under L, if θ is valid and the verifier has fulfilled its obligation to the
signer, the arbitrator extracts the full ring signature σ from θ using its private
key ASK and reveals it to the verifier, otherwise rejects.
Since there are three roles (signer, verifier, arbitrator ) in OFERS, we should consider how each role may violate different aspects of security, i.e., different security
properties. Here we require the arbitrator should not be able to cheat some participant by colluding with the other participant in the protocol since such a collusive
adversarial arbitrator can break the fair exchange trivially. Moreover, the property
signer ambiguity should also be addressed as it is the heritage of ring signatures.
Security Against Signers: For the fairness to verifiers, it is required that except
negligible probability, any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversarial signer
A should be not able to generate a verifiably partial ring signature, which can be
accepted by verifiers, but cannot be recovered to a valid full ring signature by an
honest arbitrator. The property is formally defined by the following game:
SetupTTP (κ) −→

(ASK, AP K)

(m, L∗ , θ) ←−

AORes (AP K)

σ
Success of A

←−
=

Res(m, L∗ , θ, ASK)
[PRVer(m, L∗ , θ, AP K)=1 ∧ RVer(m, L∗ , σ)=0]

where ORes denotes a resolution oracle, which takes as input a verifiably partial ring
signature on a message m under a public-key list L, and outputs a full ring signature
σ on m under L. In this game, the adversary A is allowed to arbitrarily (i.e., not
necessarily following the key generation algorithm) generate public keys to form a
list L∗ . For each public key in L∗ , A may not know the corresponding private key.
The chosen-key model is therefore accommodated here.
Definition 3.2 (Security Against Signers) Optimistic fair exchange of ring
signatures is said to be secure against signers if there is no PPT adversarial
signer A who wins the game above with non-negligible probability.
Security Against Verifiers: The property of security against verifiers requires
that, without help from the signer or the arbitrator, any PPT adversarial verifier
B should not be able to extract a full ring signature from the corresponding verifiably partial ring signature with non-negligible probability. The property is formally
defined by the following game:
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(κ) −→

(m, L0 , σ) ←−
Success of B

=
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(ASK, AP K)
(SKi , P Ki )
B OP RSig ,ORes (AP K, L)
[RVer(m, L0 , σ)=1 ∧ (m, L0 , ·) ∈
/ Query(B, ORes )]

where L0 is an arbitrary subset of the initial public-key list L consisting of all the
P Ki , the oracle ORes has been defined in the previous game, and the partial ring
signature signing oracle OP RSig , given as input a message m and a public key list
L00 , outputs a verifiably partial ring signature on m under L00 using the arbitrator’s
public key AP K. The Query(B, ORes ) is the set of valid queries which B asks to
ORes . In this game, B can ask the arbitrator for resolving any verifiably partial ring
signature with respect to any sublist of L. Note that here chosen-public key attacks
are considered, as the adversary B is only required to output a valid ring signature
under L0 which is a subset of L but not necessarily L. Moreover, L0 does not contain
any public key generated by B. Otherwise, B can win the game above trivially.
Definition 3.3 (Security Against Verifiers) Optimistic fair exchange of ring
signatures is said to be secure against verifiers if there is no PPT adversarial
verifier B who wins the game above with non-negligible probability.
Security Against the Arbitrator: For the fairness to signers, the property of
security against the arbitrator requires that except negligible probability, any PPT
adversarial arbitrator C should not be able to produce a full ring signature without
demanding the signer to generate a verifiably partial ring signatures. The property
is formally defined by the following game:
SetupUser (κ) −→
(ASK ∗ , AP K) ←−
0

(m, L , σ) ←−
Success of C

=

(P Ki , SKi )
C(L)
C OP RSig (ASK ∗ , AP K, L)
[RVer(m, L0 , σ)=1 ∧ (m, L0 ) ∈
/ Query(C, OP RSig )]

where the oracles ORes , OP RSig , the public-key lists L0 and L have been described
in the previous games, and ASK ∗ is the state information of C, which may not
correspond to the arbitrator’s public key AP K. Query(C, OP RSig ) is the set of valid
queries which C asks to OP RSig . We remark that this game considers both chosenkey and chosen public-key attacks in the multi-user setting, as the adversary C (a
malicious arbitrator) does not need to know the corresponding private key of the
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public key AP K and can choose any sublist L0 of the initial public-key list to forge
a ring signature.
Definition 3.4 (Security Against the Arbitrator) Optimistic fair exchange of
ring signatures is said to be secure against the arbitrator if there is no PPT
adversarial arbitrator C who wins the game above with non-negligible probability.
In [AOS02], Abe et al. specified the security definition of signer ambiguity. In our
OFERS scheme, the signer should be still ambiguous in its own ring. By updating
Abe et al.’s definition in the setting of OFERS, we formally define signer ambiguity
as follows:
Definition 3.5 (Signer Ambiguity) Let L = {P Ki } be an initial public-key list,
where each P Ki is generated by running SetupUser → (P Ki , SKi ), and AP K be
the arbitrator’s public key generated by running SetupTTP → (AP K, ASK). An
OFERS protocol is called perfectly signer-ambiguous, if for any message m,
any public-key list L, any public key AP K of the arbitrator, any valid full ring
signature σ ← RSign(m, L, SKs ), and an associated verifiably partial ring signature θ ← PRSig(m, L, σ, AP K), where SKs is the signer’s private key, given
(m, L, θ, σ, AP K), any unbound adversary D outputs index i such that SKs = SKi
with probability exactly

1
,
|L|

where |L| denotes the size of L.

Remark 1. Comparing with Abe et al.’s signer ambiguity [AOS02] for ring signatures, we also provide the verifiably partial ring signature θ of a full ring signature
σ to the adversary D, which allows D acquiring more information to break signer
ambiguity. In fact, this is necessary because the signer ambiguity in ring signatures
does not always guarantee the same property for OFERS (refer to the counterexample discussion in Section 3.5). As the unbound adversary D can derive all private
keys from L, the above definition essentially means that for fixed (m, L, AP K), the
distributions of θ and σ generated by using any private key SKi are identical. In
addition, Definition 3.5 specifies perfect signer ambiguity, and it can be easily extended to define statistical and computational signer ambiguity, two weaker versions
of ambiguity.
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The Proposed Scheme

In our OFERS scheme, we use verifiably encrypted ring signatures (VERS) as verifiably partial ring signatures. In this section, we first present how to produce a VERS,
and then give an optimistic fair exchange protocol of ring signatures. In order to
provide an efficient zero-knowledge proof, Abe et al.’s ring signature scheme in all
discrete-log case is employed in our OFERS scheme. The generation and verification
of ring signatures are similar to the all discrete-log ring signature scheme in Section
3.2.1 except some limitation of selecting α and si . For the sake of simplicity, in our
VERS scheme, we always encrypt the last si , i.e. sn−1 , as the hidden value. Obviously this does not affect the scheme’s security since the sequence of the public-key
list can be arbitrarily changed by the signer and any si in (s0 , ..., sn−1 ) can be the
hidden value no matter who the signer is. Then we use Camenisch and Shoup’s
CCA2-secure encryption scheme and give a proof:
H(u,e,L) 2t

s

n−1
P K{(sn−1 , t, r) : w = gn−1
∧ u2 = g2t ∧ e2 = y1 2t h2sn−1 ∧ v2 = (y2 y3

) ∧

s

ŵ = hr1 h2n−1 ∧ −2l < sn−1 < 2l }
for convincing the verifier the validity of the encryption.

3.4.1

Verifiably Encrypted Ring Signature

The generation of a VERS consists of two steps. One is producing a conventional
ring signature consisting of three algorithms denoted by RS = (RKG, Sig, Ver),
the other is encrypting the ring signature consisting of three algorithms denoted by
EN = (Gen, Enc, Dec) with a zero-knowledge showing the validity of the ring
signature’s encryption. Suppose there are two rings called RI and RJ . Ui and Uj
denote the users in these two rings respectively. A signer Uk in the ring RI sends a
VERS on a message m to a verifier in the ring RJ . LI and LJ denote the public-key
list of the ring RI and RJ , and nI = |LI | and nJ = |LJ | denote the size of LI and
LJ respectively.
SetupTTP : On input the security parameter κ, the arbitrator executes the key
generation algorithm to output the public key (n, g, y1 , y2 , y3 , h) and the private key
(x1 , x2 , x3 ) under Camenisch and Shoup’s encryption scheme [CS03]. qA denotes
the order of g, and l is an integer such that 2l+1 < qA . Meanwhile, the arbitrator generates h1 , h2 and n, which are used in the zero-knowledge proof introduced
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in Section 3.2.2 (In order to avoid being factored, the modulus n must be large enough but does not need to depend on κ) and publishes (n, g, y1 , y2 , y3 , h, h1 , h2 , n, l).
SetupUser : The setup of users is similar to the ring signature scheme in Section
3.2.1. For the user Ui , let yi = gixi mod pi , where the order of gi is qi > 2l+1 . xi
is the secret key and (yi , pi , qi , gi ) is the public key. Hi : {0, 1}∗ → Zqi is public
collision-resistant hash functions.
RSign: The signer Uk in the ring RI signs a message m by executing the algorithm
below:
1. Randomly select α ∈ Zqk , and compute ck+1 = Hk+1 (LI , m, gkα mod pk ).
2. For i = k + 1, . . . , nI − 1, 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, randomly select si ∈ (−2(l−2)/ ,
2(l−2)/ ), and compute ci+1 = Hi+1 (LI , m, gisi yici mod pi ).
3. Compute sk = α − xk ck mod qk , where sk ∈ (−2(l−2)/ , 2(l−2)/ ). If sk ∈
/
(−2(l−2)/ , 2(l−2)/ ), properly reselect α and run the Step 1 to 3 again until sk
lies in the right interval. The resulting ring signature is σI = (c0 , s0 , . . . , snI −1 ).
RVer: For i = 0, . . . , nI − 1, the verifier computes ei = gisi yici mod pi , then compute
ci+1 = Hi+1 (LI , m, ei ) if i 6= nI − 1. If c0 = H0 (LI , m, enI −1 ), the verifier accepts σI
as a valid ring signature, reject otherwise.
PRSig: The algorithm is used for converting a full ring signature σI to a verifiably
encrypted ring signature θI . Let ĥ : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}η be a collision-resistant hash
function and the public label L = m||LI .
sn

−1

1. Compute w = gnI I−1 and encrypt snI −1 by computing
u = gt ,

snI −1

e = y1t h

H(u,e,L) t

,

v = abs(y2 y3

)

under Camenisch and Shoup’s encryption scheme.
2. Randomly select r ∈ Zn , r1 ∈ (−2l−2 , 2l−2 ), r2 ∈ (−(n2η ) , (n2η ) ) and r3 ∈
snI −1

(−(n2η ) , (n2η ) ), compute ŵ = hr1 h2
u0 = gr3 , e0 = y1 r3 hr1 and v0 =

mod n and t1 = gnr1I −1 , t2 = hr12 hr21 ,

H(u,e,L) r3
(y2 y3
)

in their own groups.
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3. Compute ĉ = ĥ(LI , m, w, ŵ, u, e, v, gnI −1 , g, h1 , h2 , t1 , t2 , u02 , e02 , v02 ) and v1 =
r1 − ĉsnI −1 , v2 = r2 − ĉr, v3 = r3 − ĉt in Z. The resulting VERS is θI =
(c0 , s0 , ..., snI −2 , w, u, e, v, ŵ, ĉ, t1 , t2 , u0 , e0 , v0 , v1 , v2 , v3 ).
PRVer: The verifier first computes ĉ0 = ĥ(LI , m, w, ŵ, u, e, v, gnI −1 , g, h1 , h2 , gnv1I −1 wĉ ,
H(u,e,L) 2v3 2ĉ

hv12 hv21 ŵĉ , g2v3 u2ĉ , y1 2v3 h2v1 e2ĉ , (y2 y3

)

v ), and checks whether ĉ0 = ĉ and −2l−1 <

v1 < 2l−1 . If any condition does not hold, outputs the VERS θI is invalid, otherwise
cn

computes ei = gisi yici for i = 0, . . . , nI − 2 and enI −1 = wynII−1 , and then computes
−1

ci+1 = Hi+1 (LI , m, ei ) if i 6= nI − 1. If c0 = H0 (LI , m, enI −1 ), the verifier accepts θI ,
reject otherwise.
Res: After the verifier shows a proof that he has fillfulled his obligation to the
signer, the arbitrator decrypts the ciphertext (u, e, v) using its secret key (x1 , x2 , x3 )
to extract snI −1 , and reveals the full ring signature σI to the verifier.

3.4.2

Optimistic Fair Exchange of Ring Signatures

By applying the verifiably encrypted ring signature scheme above, an optimistic fair
exchange protocol of ring signatures can easily be set up. Suppose two users Ui and
Uj in the rings RI and RJ respectively exchange their ring signatures on a message
m. Either Ui or Uj sends his/her own signatures to the other ring without knowing
who is the real receiver in the other ring. The optimistic fair exchange protocol
proceeds as follows:
1. Ui computes his ring signature σI =RSign(m, LI , SKi ), and converts this ring
signature into a VERS θI =PRSig(m, LI , σI , AP K) using the arbitrator’s public key AP K, then sends θI to RJ .
2. Uj checks whether PRVer(m, LI , θI , AP K)= 1. If no, Uj quits, otherwise Uj
computes his ring signature σJ and sends it to RI .
3. Ui checks whether RVer(m, LJ , σJ )=1, if no, Ui stops the protocol, otherwise
Ui sends σI to RJ .
4. Uj checks whether RVer(m, LI , σI )=1, if yes, Uj accepts this ring signature.
If σI is invalid or Uj receives nothing from RI , Uj sends the arbitrator θI and
σJ to apply for resolution. The arbitrator first checks whether σJ is valid, if
yes, the arbitrator runs the algorithm Res(m, LI , θI , ASK) to recover σI , then
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sends σI to RJ and σJ to RI . If σJ is invalid, the arbitrator will send a signal
to both RI and RJ to inform Ui and Uj that the protocol has been terminated.

Note that after Step 1, Uj can decide to carry on the protocol at any time he wants,
which might give Uj some advantages. To solve this problem, before the protocol
runs, Ui and Uj can set up a time point at which the protocol must be completed.

3.5

Security Proofs

In this session, we prove that our OFE protocol for ring signatures is secure in the
multi-user setting under adaptive chosen message, chosen-key and chosen public-key
attacks. Let RS = (RKG, RSig, RVer) denote Abe et al.’s ring signature scheme,
EN=(Gen, Enc, Dec) denote Camenisch-Shoup public-key encryption scheme,
and π be a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof showing the proper encryption of
a full ring signature. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 1: The proposed optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures is secure,
i.e., satisfies Definitions 3.2-3.5, if the underlying RS is secure with signer ambiguity
and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message and chosen public-key
attacks, EN is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2), and π is
a simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.
Proof. Security against signers: In our OFERS protocol, a valid verifiably
encrypted ring signature θ = (c0 , s0 , s1 , · · · , sn−2 , w, u, e, v, ŵ, ĉ, t1 , t2 , u0 , e0 , v0 , v1 , v2 , v3 )
consists of three parts. The first part (c0 , s0 , s1 , · · · , sn−2 , w) is a ‘ring signature’,
s

n−1
where sn−1 is hidden in w = gn−1
. The second part (u, e, v) is the ciphertext of

encrypting sn−1 under the arbitrator’s public key, where u = gt , e = y1t hsn−1 and
H(u,e,L) t

v = abs(y2 y3

) for some t. The third part (ŵ, ĉ, t1 , t2 , u0 , e0 , v0 , v1 , v2 , v3 ) provides

a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof:
H(u,e,L) 2t

s

n−1
∧ u2 = g2t ∧ e2 = y1 2t h2sn−1 ∧ v2 = (y2 y3
π = P K{(sn−1 , t, r) : w = gn−1

)

s

∧ ŵ = hr1 h2n−1 ∧ −2l < sn−1 < 2l },
which shows that the encrypted sn−1 is the same value hidden in w. Suppose an
adversary A breaks the security against signers in our OFERS protocol by forging a
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VERS θ = (c0 , s0 , s1 , · · · , sn−2 , w, u, e, v, ŵ, ĉ, t1 , t2 , u0 , e0 , v0 , v1 , v2 , v3 ) w.r.t a publics

0

n−1
key list L∗ generated by himself, where w = gn−1
but e = y1t hsn−1 for s0n−1 6= sn−1 .

For each public key in L∗ , A may not know the corresponding private key. According to Definition 3.2, A wins the game of security against signers if and only if the
corresponding full ring signature of θ is σ = (c0 , s0 , s1 , ..., sn−2 , sn−1 ) and (u, e, v) is
decrypted to get s0n−1 , where s0n−1 6= sn−1 . However, this is infeasible due to the
soundness of the zero-knowledge proof π. Hence our OFERS protocol is secure against signers if π is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK).
Security against verifiers: Suppose an adversarial verifier B breaks the
security against verifiers in the proposed OFERS protocol. We now construct a
distinguisher B̄, who can successfully distinguish the encryption of two messages with
the same length of its choice from a challenger in the CCA2 game for CamenischShoup encryption scheme with non-negligible probability. Note that B̄ is allowed to
access the decryption oracle ODec of the encryption scheme. According to Definition
3.3, B wins the game of security against verifiers if B produces a valid ring signature
σ on a message m under a public-key list L0 without asking the resolution oracle ORes
any query (m, L0 , θ). As (m, L0 , σ) is a successful forgery of B, the situation that B
did not ask any corresponding VERS θ of σ via the partial ring signature signing
oracle OP RSig is negligible due to security against the arbitrator proved below. Hence
we require that B gets θ from OP RSig here. Now we show how to construct B̄ in
detail.
For the given target Camenisch-Shoup encryption scheme EN=(Gen, Enc,
Dec) with the public key AP K, the distinguisher B̄ repeatedly executes Abe et
al.’s key generation algorithm, RKG → {P Ki , SKi }, to form a public-key list L.
Then B̄ sends (AP K, L) to B as the input of the OFERS protocol. Let k be the
total number of the queries that B issues to OP RSig . After arbitrarily selecting j
from {1, 2, ..., k}, B̄ simulates OP RSig ’s response to each query (mi , Li ) issued by B,
where i = 1, 2, ..., k, Li ⊆ L and ni = |Li |, as follows:
1. If i 6= j, B̄ signs the message mi w.r.t Li using the private key SK0 to
generate a ring signature σi = RSig(mi , Li , SK0 ) = (ci0 , si0 , ..., sini −1 ) and
si n

−1

i
returns a VERS θi = (ci0 , si0 , ..., sini −2 , wi , εi , πi ), where wi = gin −1
and
i

εi = EncAP K (sini −1 ) under Camenisch-Shoup encryption scheme, and πi is
a NIZK proof showing that εi encrypts the same value hidden in wi , i.e. sini −1 .
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2. If i = j, B̄ computes σi = RSig(mi , Li , SK0 ) = (ci0 , si0 , ..., sini −1 ) and chooses
a proper ŝini −1 in the same interval of sini −1 but sini −1 6= ŝini −1 . Then B̄
sets ṡ1 = sini −1 and ṡ0 = ŝini −1 and sends ṡ1 and ṡ0 to its CCA2 challenger.
The challenger returns a ciphertext εb , which equals either EncAP K (sini −1 ) or
EncAP K (ŝini −1 ). After that, B̄ returns θi = (ci0 , si0 , ..., sini −2 , wi , εi , πi ), where
si n

−1

i
, εi = εb , and πi is a simulated NIZK proof showing that εi encrypts
wi = gin −1
i

the same value hidden in wi .
The distinguisher B̄ simulates the resolution oracle ORes ’s response to B’s queries
(mi , Li , θi ) using the decryption oracle ODec as follows:
1. If πi is valid and Li 6= Lj , B̄ asks ODec to extract the plaintext sini −1 from εi
and returns the ring signature σi = (ci0 , si0 , ..., sini −1 ) on mi under Li .
2. If πi is valid and Li = Lj , B̄ checks whether mi = mj . If yes, B̄ aborts the
simulation and sends a random bit to its CCA2 challenger. Otherwise, B̄ asks
ODec to extract the plaintext sini −1 from εi and returns the ring signature
σi = (ci0 , si0 , ..., sini −1 ) on mi under Li .
3. If πi is invalid, B̄ returns B a random value.
Note that B cannot get the valid response from ORes on any partial ring signature which contains εb . This is guaranteed by the properties soundness and
simulation-soundness [Sah99] of the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof π. Soundness guarantees that a PPT prover should not be able to convince the verifier of
a false statement except negligible probability. And simulation-soundness remains
this case even through the prover has been given a simulated proof of his/her choosing. Therefore, in the case of i = j, even after B has seen a simulated NIZK proof
πi , he/she cannot forge a partial signature θ∗ containing εb together with a valid π ∗
under m∗ and L∗ , where (m∗ , L∗ ) 6= (mj , Lj ).
If εb = EncAP K (ŝini −1 ) (i.e. b = 0), θi looks valid but, in fact, σi = (ci0 , si0 , ..., ŝini −1 )
is not a valid ring signature because of ŝini −1 6= sini −1 . The probability of B forging a
valid ring signature on mj is therefore negligible. If εb = EncAP K (sini −1 ) (i.e. b = 1),
εj is an valid encryption of sini −1 which is a part of a valid ring signature on mj .
The attack environment required by B is perfectly simulated. Suppose (m, L0 , σ) is
the forgery of B, if m = mj and L0 = Lj , B̄ outputs 1 and wins the CCA2 game by
indicating that ṡ1 = sini −1 is the plaintext of εb , otherwise B̄ sends a random bit to
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the CCA2 challenger. Consequently, if B wins the game of security against verifiers
with a non-negligible probability, B̄’s advantage against its CCA2 challenger is also
non-negligible. Hence our OFERS protocol is secure against verifiers if the underlying encryption scheme EN is CCA2-secure.
Security against the arbitrator: Suppose an adversarial arbitrator C
breaks the security against the arbitrator in the proposed OFERS protocol. We
construct a forger C¯ for Abe et al.’s ring signature scheme RS = (RKG, RSig,
RVer) with access to a signing oracle ORSig .
¯ the adversarial arbitrator
For the initial public-key list L given to the forger C,
C takes L as input and then outputs (ASK ∗ , AP K), where AP K is set as the arbitrator’s public key for Camenisch-Shoup encryption scheme, and ASK ∗ is the state
information which may not correspond to AP K. (ASK ∗ , AP K, L) is the input of
the OFERS protocol. After that, C begins to ask queries to the partial ring signature signing oracle OP RSig , for which the responses can be perfectly simulated by C¯
using ORSig : For any message mi and any sublist L00 ⊆ L, C¯ asks its signing oracle
ORSig to get a ring signature σi , then encrypts σi under AP K to get a VERS θi
and generates the NIZK proof πi . Finally, C outputs the forgery (m0 , σ 0 ) such that
RVer(m0 , L0 , σ 0 ) = 1 and (m0 , L0 ) ∈
/ Query(C, OP RSig ), which means C¯ never asks
ORSig to response a valid ring signature on m0 w.r.t L0 . In our OFERS protocol, σ 0 is
just the conventional ring signature on m0 w.r.t L0 , so C¯ has succeeded for obtaining
σ 0 as the forgery of the message m0 without asking the signing oracle ORSig . It is
contradictory to the existential unforgeability of Abe et al.’s ring signature scheme
against adaptive chosen message and chosen public-key attacks. Hence our OFERS
protocol must be secure against the arbitrator.
Signer ambiguity: Suppose that our OFERS protocol does not meet signer
ambiguity, which means that there is an unbound adversary D can tell which private
key SKs was used to produce a given tuple (m, L, θ, σ, AP K) with the probability
not equal to 1/|L|. Then, from D we now construct an adversary D̄ that breaks
signer ambiguity of Abe et al.’s ring signature scheme, which thus leads to a contradiction. For a given initial public-key list L in Abe et al.’s scheme we run the key
generation algorithm of Chamenisch-Shoup encryption scheme to get the arbitrator’s key pair (ASK, AP K). For a target (m, L, σ, AP K), D̄ runs PRSig algorithm
to get θ, i.e. θ ← PRSig(m, L, σ, AP K). By forwarding (m, L, θ, σ, AP K) to D,
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D̄ just outputs the index returned by D as its guess which private key was used to
issue (m, L, σ, AP K). It is easy to see that D̄ breaks the signer ambiguity of Abe et
al.’s ring signature scheme with the exact same probability as D breaks the signer
ambiguity of our OFERS protocol.



Remark 2. In the proofs above, we do not give the specific details about the underlying (Abe et al.’s) ring signature scheme and (Camenisch and Shoup’s) encryption
scheme, as our construction (specified in Section 3.4) can be extended to a generic
scheme, i.e., based on any secure ring signature scheme and encryption scheme, the
associated proofs can be obtained by simply adapting the proofs above. In addition,
from our proofs we can see that a secure ring signature scheme with signer ambiguity
does not necessarily guarantee an OFERS protocol preserving the same property.
The counterexample is very simple: just modify our OFERS protocol such that the
VERS θ includes a public key P Ki which indicates that the private key SKi was
used to issue the corresponding ring signature σ. For this scheme, it is not difficult
to see that the proofs for the first three properties still hold, but not for signer
ambiguity since, with the reminder P Ki , the adversary can tell with the probability
1 that SKi was used to issue a tuple (m, L, θ, σ, AP K).

3.6

Summary

In this chapter, for achieving better privacy in optimistic fair exchange, we present
the first solution of optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (OFERS) by first
formally defining its security model in the multi-user setting under adaptive chosen
message, chosen-key and chosen public-key attacks. We have also proposed a concrete scheme of verifiably encrypted ring signature (VERS) and used it to build an
optimistic fair exchange protocol. The proposed scheme is proven to be secure against signers, verifiers and the arbitrator and satisfy the property signer ambiguity
under our security definitions.
It should be noted that the proposed OFERS scheme does not satisfy the important property abuse-freeness. That is because, once a VERS θ is correctly issued by
the signer, θ can be verified by any outsider of the protocol since the non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof showing the validity of VERS can be universally verified. This
flaw might benefit some malicious parties in fair exchange. Furthermore, in order
to give an efficient zero-knowledge proof, only Abe et al.’s ring signature scheme in
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all discrete-log case is applied in the proposed OFERS scheme. Actually, by some
suitable modifications, the generic scheme of Abe et al.’s ring signatures can also be
efficiently employed in our construction of OFERS. The further solutions on these
two issues will be given in Chapter 4.

Chapter 4
Abuse-free Optimistic Fair Exchange of
Ring Signatures
In this chapter, the notion of abuse-free optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures
(AOFERS) is first proposed, together with the formal security model of abusefreeness in OFERS. By updating the proposed OFERS scheme introduced in Chapter 3, we propose two efficient and concrete schemes of AOFERS based on all
discrete-log ring signature scheme and the generic scheme of Abe et al.’s ring signatures respectively. Finally, we formally prove that the proposed AOFERS schemes
are perfectly abuse-free in our security model.

4.1

Introduction

In recent studies, the property abuse-freeness is highly desired in optimistic fair
exchange in order to prevent a honest party from being exploited to benefit some
dishonest party. Intuitively, in an abuse-free fair exchange protocol, any interim
output of the protocol cannot be accepted as the valid evidence showing that some
participant has committed to sign the message before the protocol is executed successfully. In contrast, an OFE protocol without abuse-freeness may give a dishonest
party some advantages by showing the universally verifiable interim results to an
outsider of the protocol. There are only few works on this topic, In [GJM99], Garay
et al. proposed an abuse-free optimistic contract signing protocol based on the
technology of private contract signatures. Wang [Wan10] proposed an abuse-free
fair contract-signing protocol based on the RSA signature, in which an interactive
protocol is employed to prove the validity of the RSA-based undeniable signature
[GRK00]. In [HYWS08a], Huang et al. introduced ambiguous optimistic fair exchange, in which an outsider cannot tell which of a signer and a verifier issues a
given partial signature, that is, the partial signature is indistinguishable between
45
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the signer and the verifier so that the verifier cannot convince anybody about the
authorship of the partial signature. Huang et al.’s scheme is not perfectly abuse-free
since an outsider can be certain of that the real producer of the partial signature
must be either the signer or the verifier. Except these two, no one can issue such a
partial signature.
In this chapter, in order to meet the property abuse-freeness, we follow Wang’s
idea in [Wan10] to construct abuse-free optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures
based on an interactive zero-knowledge proof. We first give the formal definition of
AOFERS and define the security model of abuse-freeness in the multi-user setting
under adaptive chosen message, chosen-key and chosen public-key attacks. Then we
propose a concrete scheme of AOFERS based on Abe et al.’s all discrete-log ring
signature scheme. An interactive zero-knowledge proof, which is secure against the
on-line attack introduced in [Wan10], is applied in the construction of our scheme.
Moreover, we present a solution to employ the generic scheme of Abe et al.’s ring
signatures [AOS02] in our AOFERS scheme. Finally, we give the formal proof to
show that the proposed AOFERS scheme is perfectly abuse-free in our security
model.

4.2

Security Definitions

By updating the security definitions of OFERS in Section 3.3, we define the notion
of abuse-free optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (AOFERS) in the following
way:
Definition 4.1.

(Syntax) abuse-free optimistic fair exchange of ring

signatures (AOFERS) consists of nine probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms and
a zero-knowledge proof 1 .
• SetupTTP : On input a security parameter κ, the algorithm outputs a publicprivate arbitration key pair (AP K, ASK) and some auxiliary information if
necessary.
• SetupUser : On input κ and (optionally) the arbitrator’s public key AP K, the
algorithm outputs public-private key pairs (P Ki , SKi ) for each user in the
1

In concrete schemes, the zero-knowledge proof for showing the validity of partial ring signatures
is executed in the form of an interactive protocol.
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ring. These public keys form a public-key list L.
• RSig(m, L, SKs ): A signer Us in the ring executes the algorithm by inputting
a message m, a public-keys list L including P Ks and its corresponding private
key SKs , then outputs a ring signature σ.
• RVer(m, L, σ): On input a message m, a ring signature σ on m under a
public-key list L, a verifier executes the algorithm to output either 1 or 0, which
means accept or reject respectively.
• PRGen(m, L, SKs , AP K): On input a message m, a public-key list L
including P Ks , the signer Us ’s private key SKs and the arbitrator’s public key
AP K, the algorithm outputs a partial ring signature θ with the state information ς 2 .
• PRP (m, L, θ, ς, AP K): On input a message m, a signer’s public-key list
L, the arbitrator’s public key AP K, a partial ring signature θ on m under
L with the state information ς, the zero-knowledge proof between signers and
verifiers outputs the evidence π to show that the partial ring signature θ can
be converted to a full ring signature σ by the arbitrator.
• PRVer(m, L, θ, π, AP K): On input a message m, a signer’s public-key
list L, a partial ring signature θ on m under L, the evidence π generated by a
zero-knowledge proof between signers and verifiers and the arbitrator’s public
key AP K, the verifier executes the algorithm to output either 1 or 0, which
means accept or reject respectively.
• PRSim(m, L, AP K): The algorithm perfectly simulates the outputs in
PRGen without the signer’s secret key SKs . On input a message m, a signer’s
public-key list L and the arbitrator’s public key AP K, the algorithm outputs
a simulated partial ring signature θ on m under L with the simulated state
information ς.
• PRPSim(m, L, θ, AP K): The algorithm perfectly simulates the outputs
in PRP. On input a message m, a signer’s public-key list L, a partial ring
signature θ and the arbitrator’s public key AP K, the algorithm outputs the
simulated evidence π of the zero-knowledge proof.
2

ς contains some necessary state information used in the following zero-knowledge proof.
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• Res(m, L, θ, ASK): The resolution algorithm is executed by the arbitrator if
the verifier does not receive the original ring signature σ from the signer ring,
but has obtained the corresponding partial ring signature θ on the message m
under the public-key list L. After the verifier has fulfilled its obligation to the
signer, the arbitrator converts the partial ring signature θ to its corresponding
full ring signature σ using its private key ASK. If σ is valid, the arbitrator
sends it to the verifier ring, otherwise sends an error message.
Abuse-freeness: The property abuse-freeness requires that, in a fair exchange
protocol, with non-negligible probability any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT)
adversary D should not be able to convince an outside party that the signer has
committed to sign the message by showing any intermediate result at any point of
the fair exchange protocol. The property is formally defined by the following game:
SetupTTP (κ)

−→

(ASK, AP K)

(m, L, ∆) ←−

DORes (AP K)

PRGen(m, L0 , SKs , AP K)

−→

(θ1 , ς1 )

PRP(m, L0 , θ1 , ς1 , AP K)

−→

π1

PRSim(m, L , AP K)

−→

(θ0 , ς0 )

PRPSim(m, L0 , θ0 , AP K)

−→

π0

0

(0, 1) −→

b

(θb , πb )

−→

(θ∗ , π ∗ )

b0

←−

DORes (∆, θ∗ , π ∗ , AP K)

Success of D

=

[b = b0 ∧ (m, L0 , θ∗ ) ∈
/ Query(D, ORes )]

where ∆ is the state information of D, L is a public-key list generated by D, L0 is
a sublist of L, ORes is the resolution oracle, and Query(D, ORes ) is the set of valid
queries which D asks to ORes . In the oracle queries, the adversary D is allowed
to ask ORes for resolving any partial ring signature except θ∗ with respect to any
message and any public list. And D may not know the corresponding private keys
of such a public list. However, for the challenge public-key list L0 , it is required
that D must prove that he/she knows the corresponding private keys, and all the
public-private key pairs are generated by the algorithm SetupUser .
Definition 4.2 (Abuse-freeness) Abuse-free optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures is said to be abuse-free if there is no PPT adversary D who wins the game
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above with non-negligible probability.
Remark 3. Essentially, abuse-freeness depends on whether there exists a simulator which can perfectly simulate all the intermediate outputs in an OFE protocol.
In [HYWS08a], Huang et al. proposed the notion of ambiguous optimistic fair exchange, in which the verifier cannot convince any outsider about the authorship of
a partial signature issued by the signer since the partial signature can be indistinguishably generated by the signer or the verifier. In some cases, ambiguous fair
exchange and abuse-free fair exchange can solve the same problem. However, ambiguous fair exchange is not equivalent to abuse-free fair exchange. That is because,
in ambiguous fair exchange, the signer’s intermediate outputs, i.e. the partial signature, can only be simulated by the verifier using its secret key. But in abuse-free fair
exchange, the signer’s intermediate results can be perfectly simulated by anyone. In
our construction of AOFERS, an interactive zero-knowledge proof is used for showing the validity of the signer’s partial signature. That means only the verifier who is
involved in the interactive proof can be convinced by the signer. And after executing the protocol, any intermediate result will become useless since there exists an
efficient simulation algorithm which can simulate all these results perfectly. Hence,
in the partial ring signature verification algorithm PRVer, only the evidence π is
not enough to convince the verifier the validity of the partial ring signature θ. It is
necessary for the verifier to ensure that π is the correct outputs of the interactive
zero-knowledge proof PRP with the signer.

4.3

The Proposed Scheme

In this section, we first present how to build a concrete AOFERS scheme based on
Abe et al.’s ring signatures in all discrete-log case. Then we propose a solution,
by which the generic scheme of Abe et al.’s ring signatures can be applied in our
AOFERS scheme.

4.3.1

All Discrete-log Case

In our AOFERS scheme, an interactive zero-knowledge proof is employed instead
of the non-interactive proof in the normal OFERS scheme in Chapter 3. In order
to meet the property abuse-freeness, it is required that the verifier cannot convince
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an outsider that the proof is just given by the prover via showing any intermediate
output of the proof. Due to the property zero-knowledge of the proof, the distribution of the outputs in a simulated proof is (computationally) indistinguishable
from that in a real proof. Concretely, in order to simulate the outputs in Camenisch and Michels’ zero-knowledge proof introduced in Section 3.2.2, the verifier
can randomly select s1 , s2 and c in the corresponding intervals, and then compute
t1 = g1s1 y1c , t2 = g2s1 y2c and t3 = hs12 hs21 ỹ c instead. Obviously, any intermediate output
of the proof can be perfectly simulated by such an efficient algorithm. However, in
[Wan10], Wang described an on-line attack, in which, by colluding with an outsider
during the execution of the interactive zero-knowledge proof, an adversarial verifier
can successfully convince the outsider that the proof is given by the prover. In such
an on-line attack, after receiving the prover’s commitments t1 , t2 and t3 in Step 1,
the verifier can show all these commitments to the outsider and ask him/her to
generate a challenge c instead in Step 2. Finally the outsider can be convinced by
the right responses s1 and s2 from the prover in Step 3 since the commitments t1 , t2
and t3 he/she has seen cannot be changed by the verifier.
In order to protect against such an on-line attack, Wang proposed an idea based
on trapdoor commitment schemes in [Wan10]. Generally, a common commitment
scheme [BCC88, Ped91] only has two properties hiding and binding: hiding means
no one can know which value is committed in a given commitment except its producer, and binding guarantees that, once a commitment has been made, the committed
value in a given commitment cannot be changed. Moreover, in a trapdoor commitment scheme [Gen04, MY04], there is a trapdoor by which a trapdoor commitment
can be opened in different ways, but without the trapdoor, the property binding is
still guaranteed.
Hence, by a trapdoor commitment scheme, Camenisch and Michels’ interactive
zero-knowledge proof can be modified for abuse-freeness in Figure 4.1. Before the
interactive zero-knowledge proof is executed, the verifier must publish his own trapdoor commitment scheme denoted by T Com(). During the execution of the proof,
instead of directly sending t1 , t2 and t3 to the verifier in Step 1, the prover first
uses the verifier’s trapdoor commitment scheme to compute t¯1 = T Com(t1 , t01 ), t¯2 =
T Com(t2 , t02 ) and t¯3 = T Com(t3 , t03 ) by randomly selecting t01 , t02 and t03 , then sends
t¯1 , t¯2 and t¯3 to the verifier. After receiving the challenge c in Step 2, the prover
sends the responses s1 and s2 together with t1 , t01 , t2 , t02 , t3 , t03 to the verifier in Step 3.
The verifier first checks whether the trapdoor commitments t¯1 = T Com(t1 , t01 ), t¯2 =
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Figure 4.1: The modified interactive zero-knowledge proof for abuse-freeness

T Com(t2 , t02 ) and t¯3 = T Com(t3 , t03 ) are prepared correctly, and then checks whether
s1 and s2 are the right responses to t1 , t2 and t3 .
In this improved interactive zero-knowledge proof, the outsider cannot be convinced anymore by the on-line attack. That is because, due to the verifier’s trapdoor
commitment scheme used in Step 1, the verifier cannot know the prover’s answers
t1 , t2 and t3 , which are committed in the trapdoor commitments t¯1 , t¯2 and t¯3 , but can
open the trapdoor commitments in a different way. That means, even if the verifier
shows all these trapdoor commitments to the outsider for a challenge c in Step 2,
the outsider cannot believe that t1 , t2 and t3 received in Step 3 are just generated by
the prover since the outsider cannot distinguish whether t1 , t2 and t3 are prepared
by the prover or forged by the verifier using the trapdoor. Hence the on-line attack
does not work in this improved interactive zero-knowledge proof.
The construction of the concrete AOFERS scheme based on Abe et al.’s ring signatures in all discrete-log case is similar to the normal OFERS scheme in Chapter
3 except that the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is replaced by the interactive proof introduced above, and both rings must publish their own trapdoor commitment scheme denoted by T ComI () and T ComJ () in advance. The algorithms
SetupTTP , SetupUser , RSign and RVer in the proposed AOFERS scheme are
the same as that in the normal OFERS scheme. The other algorithms and the
interactive zero-knowledge proof are shown as follows:
PRGen: The algorithm is used for converting a full ring signature σI to an encrypted ring signature θI . Let L = m||LI be the public label under Camenisch and
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sn

−1

Shoup’s encryption scheme. Compute w = gnI I−1 and encrypt snI −1 by computing
u = gt ,

snI −1

e = y1t h

,

H(u,e,L) t

v = abs(y2 y3

)

Then the signer sends the encrypted ring signature θI = (c0 , s0 , ..., snI −2 , w, u, e, v)
to the verifier ring.
PRP: For convincing the verifier that the signer’s full ring signature has been
correctly encrypted under the arbitration key, an interactive zero-knowledge proof
is executed between the signer ring and the verifier ring.
1. The signer randomly selects r ∈ Zn , r1 ∈ (−2l−2 , 2l−2 ), r2 ∈ (−(n2η ) , (n2η ) )
snI −1

and r3 ∈ (−(n2η ) , (n2η ) ), and computes ŵ = hr1 h2
H(u,e,L) r3

hr12 hr21 , u0 = gr3 , e0 = y1 r3 hr1 and v0 = (y2 y3

)

mod n, t1 = gnr1I −1 , t2 =

in their own groups respec-

tively. Then the signer uses the verifier ring’s trapdoor commitment scheme
to compute w̄ = T ComJ (ŵ, ŵ0 ), t¯1 = T ComJ (t1 , t01 ), t¯2 = T ComJ (t2 , t02 ),
ū0 = T ComJ (u0 , u00 ), ē0 = T ComJ (e0 , e00 ) and v̄0 = T ComJ (v0 , v00 ) by randomly
selecting ŵ0 , t01 , t02 , u00 , e00 , v00 , and sends all the trapdoor commitments to the
verifier ring.
2. The verifier sends a challenge ĉ ∈R {0, 1}η back to the signer ring.
3. The signers computes the responses v1 = r1 − ĉsnI −1 , v2 = r2 − ĉr, v3 = r3 − ĉt
in Z and sends ŵ, t1 , t2 , u0 , e0 , v0 , ŵ0 , t01 , t02 , u00 , e00 , v00 with the responses v1 , v2 , v3
to the verifier ring.
PRVer: The verifier first checks whether all the trapdoor commitments are correctly prepared, and then t1 = gnv1I −1 wĉ , t2 = hv12 hv21 ŵĉ , u02 = g2v3 u2ĉ , e02 = y1 2v3 h2v1 e2ĉ ,
H(u,e,L) 2v3 2ĉ

v02 = (y2 y3

)

v

and −2l−1 < v1 < 2l−1 . If any condition does not hold, out-

puts the encrypted ring signature θI is invalid, otherwise computes ei = gisi yici for i =
cn

−1

0, . . . , nI −2 and enI −1 = wynII−1 , then computes ci+1 = Hi+1 (LI , m, ei ) if i 6= nI −1.
If c0 = H0 (LI , m, enI −1 ), the verifier accepts θI , reject otherwise.
PRSim: The algorithm outputs a simulated encrypted ring signature by the following steps:
1. Randomly select enI −1 ∈ ZpnI −1 , and compute c0 = H0 (LI , m, enI −1 ).
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2. Randomly select si ∈ (−2(l−2)/ , 2(l−2)/ ). For i = 0, ..., nI − 2, compute ei =
−cn

gisi yici mod pi and ci+1 = Hi+1 (LI , m, ei ). At last compute w = enI −1 ynI −1I

−1

mod

pnI −1 .
3. Randomly select s0 ∈ (−2(l−2)/ , 2(l−2)/ ), and compute the ciphertext
s0

u = gt ,

e = y1t h ,

H(u,e,L) t

v = abs(y2 y3

)

Then the simulated encrypted ring signature is θI = (c0 , s0 , ..., snI −2 , w, u, e, v).
PRPSim: The algorithm simulates the outputs in the interactive zero-knowledge
proof shown in PRP. Randomly select ŵ ∈ Zn , v1 ∈ (−2l−2 , 2l−2 ), v2 ∈ (−(n2η ) , (n2η ) ),
v3 ∈ (−(n2η ) , (n2η ) ) and ĉ ∈R {0, 1}η , then compute t1 = gnv1I −1 wĉ , t2 = hv12 hv21 ŵĉ , u0 =
H(u,e,L) v3 ĉ

gv3 uĉ , e0 = y1 v3 hv1 eĉ , v0 = (y2 y3

) v in their own groups respectively, then
computes their trapdoor commitments w̄ = T ComJ (ŵ, ŵ0 ), t¯1 = T ComJ (t1 , t01 ),
t¯2 = T ComJ (t2 , t02 ), ū0 = T ComJ (u0 , u00 ), ē0 = T ComJ (e0 , e00 ) and v̄0 = T ComJ (v0 , v00 )
by randomly selecting ŵ0 , t01 , t02 , u00 , e00 , v00 . The simulated outputs of the proof are
(ŵ, t1 , t2 , u0 , e0 , v0 , w̄, t̄1 , t̄2 , ū0 , ē0 , v̄0 , ŵ0 , t01 , t02 , u00 , e00 , v00 , ĉ, v1 , v2 , v3 ).
Res: After the verifier shows a proof that he has fillfulled his obligation to the
signer, the arbitrator decrypts the ciphertext (u, e, v) using its secret key (x1 , x2 , x3 )
to extract snI −1 and obtains the full ring signature σI . If σI is valid, the arbitrator
sends it to the verifier ring, otherwise sends an error message.

4.3.2

Generic Case

In Abe et al.’s generic scheme of ring signatures shown in Section 3.2.1, a user in
a ring is allowed to arbitrarily select any signature scheme, which is required to
belong to either type-T or type-H, as its own signature scheme for ring signatures.
And the signature schemes which are neither type-T nor type-H can be considered
compatible with some type-T or type-H schemes in some cases. Hence Abe et al.’s
ring signatures are constructed in not only all discrete-log case or all RSA case but
also in some mixture cases. In the generation and verification of a ring signature
in mixture case, a signer must follow the generic scheme to compute each link of
the ring signature using the corresponding signature scheme of each user. And such
a mixture ring signature is still proven existentially unforgeable against adaptive
chosen message and chosen public-key attacks [AOS02].
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In our AOEFRS scheme shown in Section 4.3.1, we only consider the ring signature scheme of all discrete-log case. In fact, for any mixture type of Abe et al.’s ring
signatures, if the last user Un−1 formed in the public-key list uses a public-private
key pair in the discrete-log case, the proposed AOEFRS scheme can still work in the
same way. That is because, in our AOFERS scheme, only the last link of a full ring
signature, i.e. sn−1 , is involved in the generation and verification of a partial ring
signature no matter what signature schemes are applied in the rest parts of the full
ring signature. However, in all RSA case or some mixture cases without discrete-log
keys, the proposed AOFERS scheme will not work anymore. To solve this dilemma,
we propose an idea that by adding an extra discrete-log public key to the end of
the initial public-key list, we can easily form a new ring with a discrete-log key at
the end. And in order to prevent anyone from forging a ring signature using this
extra public key, we require that any party including the arbitrator cannot know its
corresponding private key. One solution to this end is that the arbitrator publishes
a secure hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → hg 0 i, where hg 0 i is the same type of group in all
discrete-log ring signature scheme in Section 3.2.1. h takes some public information,
such as the initial public-key list, the message or the expiry time, as input, and outputs an integer y 0 in the public key domain of hg 0 i, where (g 0 , y 0 , p0 , q 0 ) can be used
as the extra public key. Then the signer adds the new public key with an unknown
private key to the end of the initial public-key list and uses the new public-key list
in the following fair exchange. Based on this idea, the generic scheme of Abe et al.’s
ring signatures can be easily employed in our AOFERS scheme.
SetupTTP : The setup of the arbitrator is similar with SetupTTP in Section 4.3.1
except that the arbitrator additionally publishes a secure hash function h : {0, 1}∗ →
hg 0 i, where the order of hg 0 i is q 0 > 2l+1 .
SetupUser : In the setup of users, each user can select his/her own type-H or typeT signature scheme and generates the public-private key pair. All these public keys
form a public-key list L.
RSign: The signer Uk in a ring signs a message m by executing the algorithm
below:
1. Compute h(L, m, aux) = y 0 , where aux is auxiliary information, then add
(g 0 , y 0 , p0 , q 0 ) to the end of L to form a new public-key list L0 , where n denotes

4.3. The Proposed Scheme

55

the size of L0 .
2. (Initialization): Similar with the generic scheme of ring signatures in Section
3.2.1, compute

Ak (skk ; α) , (type-T), or
ek =
β
, (type-H),
then compute ck+1 = Hk+1 (L0 , m, ek ).
3. (Forward sequence): For i = k + 1, ..., n − 1, 0, ..., k − 1, compute

Vi (si , ci , vki )
, (type-T), or
ei =
c + F (s , vk ) , (type-H),
i

i

i

i

then compute ci+1 = Hi+1 (L0 , m, ei ). If i = n−1, compute en−1 = g 0sn−1 y 0cn−1 mod
p0 instead, where sn−1 ∈ (−2(l−2)/ , 2(l−2)/ ) .
4. (Forming the ring): Compute

Zk (skk , α, ck )
, (type-T), or
sk =
I (β − c , sk ) , (type-H).
k
k
k
The resulting ring signature σ is (c0 , s0 , ..., sn−1 ).
RVer: The verifier first checks whether L0 is correctly generated from L. For
i = 0, ..., n − 2, compute

Vi (si , ci , vki )
, (type-T), or
ei =
c + F (s , vk ) , (type-H),
i
i i
i
and en−1 = g 0sn−1 y 0cn−1 mod p0 , then compute ci+1 = Hi+1 (L0 , m, ei ) if i 6= n − 1. If
c0 = H0 (L0 , m, en−1 ), the verifier accepts σ as a valid ring signature, reject otherwise.
The algorithm PRGen and the interactive zero-knowledge proof PRP are the same
as that in Section 4.3.1, where (gn−1 , yn−1 , pn−1 , qn−1 ) is equivalent to (g 0 , y 0 , p0 , q 0 )
here.
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PRVer: The verifier first checks whether L0 is valid and whether the interactive
zero-knowledge proof is correctly executed. After that, for i = 0, ..., n − 2, compute

Vi (si , ci , vki )
, (type-T), or
ei =
c + F (s , vk ) , (type-H).
i

i

i

i

and en−1 = wy 0cn−1 mod p0 , then compute ci+1 = Hi+1 (L0 , m, ei ) if i 6= n − 1. If c0 =
H0 (L0 , m, en−1 ), the verifier accepts the partial ring signature θ, reject otherwise.
PRSim: The algorithm outputs a simulated encrypted ring signature by the following steps:
1. Randomly select en−1 ∈ Zp0 , and compute c0 = H0 (L0 , m, en−1 ).
2. For i = 0, ..., n − 2, compute

Vi (si , ci , vki )
, (type-T), or
ei =
c + F (s , vk ) , (type-H),
i
i i
i
then compute ci+1 = Hi+1 (L0 , m, ei ). At last, compute w = en−1 y 0−cn−1 mod p0 .
3. Randomly select s0 ∈ (−2(l−2)/ , 2(l−2)/ ), and compute the ciphertext
u = gt ,

s0

e = y1t h ,

H(u,e,L) t

v = abs(y2 y3

)

Then the simulated encrypted ring signature is θ = (c0 , s0 , ..., sn−2 , w, u, e, v).
The algorithms PRPSim and Res are the same as that in Section 4.3.1.
Remark 4. In the partial ring signature simulation algorithm PRSim, no matter what types of public keys used in the public-key list, there always exists such
an efficient simulation algorithm. That is because a partial ring signature θ =
(c0 , s0 , ..., sn−2 , w, u, e, v) consists of two parts. The first part (c0 , s0 , ..., sn−2 , w) is a
‘ring signature’ with a hidden value sn−1 in w = g 0sn−1 , and the second part (u, e, v)
is the ciphertext of sn−1 encrypted under the arbitrator’s public key. In PRSim, after first randomly selecting the last ei , i.e. en−1 , the simulation of the ring signature
part (c0 , s0 , s1 , ..., sn−2 , w) strictly follows the ring signature verification algorithm
to compute each ei and ci , then outputs w = en−1 y 0−cn−1 mod p0 at last. Obviously,
for such a w, there must exist a sn−1 such that w = g 0sn−1 = en−1 y 0−cn−1 mod p0 , but
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the sn−1 is unknown since computing a discrete logarithm is hard in the group hg 0 i.
Hence the only difference between a normal and a simulated partial ring signature
is that, in a simulated partial ring signature, the hidden value sn−1 in w is unknown
and equal to s0 encrypted in the ciphertext with negligible probability.

4.4

Security Analysis

In this session, we prove that the proposed AOFERS schemes are perfectly abusefree in our security model. Obviously if the AOFERS scheme based on the generic
scheme of ring signatures is proven abuse-free, the scheme based on all discretelog ring signatures is also abuse-free. Let RS = (RKG, RSig, RVer) denote the
generic scheme of Abe et al.’s ring signatures, EN=(Gen, Enc, Dec) denote Camenisch and Shoup’s public-key encryption scheme, and (P,V) denote the improved
interactive zero-knowledge proof system introduced in Section 4.3.1, where π is the
outputs of the proof. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 2 The proposed abuse-free optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures
is perfectly abuse-free, i.e., satisfies Definition 4.2, if the underlying EN is secure
against adaptive chosen ciphertext (CCA2) attacks, and (P,V) is a simulation-sound
interactive zero-knowledge proof system.
Proof. Abuse-freeness: Suppose a PPT adversary D breaks abuse-freeness
in the proposed AOFERS scheme based on Abe et al.’s generic scheme of ring
signatures. We construct a distinguisher D̄ who can successfully distinguish the
encryption of two messages with the same length of its choice from a challenger in
a CCA2 game for Camenisch and Shoup’s encryption scheme with non-negligible
probability. For the given target encryption scheme EN with the public key AP K,
the distinguisher D̄ first sends AP K to D as the arbitrator’s public key. On input
AP K, the adversary D can arbitrarily outputs public-key lists and may not know the
corresponding private keys of these public-key lists. Then D̄ simulates the resolution
oracle ORes using its own decryption oracle ODes . Given a query (m, L, θ), where
θ = (c0 , s0 , ..., sn−2 , w, u, e, v), D̄ first decrypts the ciphertext (u, e, v) to get sn−1 ,
then checks whether σ = (c0 , s0 , ..., sn−1 ) is a valid ring signature. If yes, D̄ returns
σ to D, otherwise returns an error message.
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At some time, D sends the challenge (m∗ , L∗ , SL∗ ) to D̄, where SL∗ is L∗ ’s secretkey list. D̄ first check whether each public key P Ki in L∗ matches each private key
SKi in SL∗ . If not, D̄ aborts and returns a random bit, otherwise generates the
targeted partial ring signature in the following steps:
1. D̄ arbitrarily selects a secret key SKs in SL∗ and produces a full ring signature
σ ∗ ← RSig(m∗ , L∗ , SKs ), where σ ∗ = (c∗0 , s∗0 , ..., s∗n−1 ).
2. Randomly select s0 ∈ (−2(l−2)/ , 2(l−2)/ ), and set M0 = s0 , M1 = s∗n−1 . Then
send M0 and M1 to its CCA2 encryption challenger. The challenger returns a
ciphertext εb , which equals either EncAP K (M0 ) or EncAP K (M1 ).
3. D̄ executes the proof simulation algorithm PRPSim to get the simulated outputs π ∗ , then returns θ∗ = (c∗0 , s∗0 , ..., s∗n−2 , w∗ , εb , π ∗ ) to D.
After that, D̄ carries on simulating the resolution oracle ORes as follow:
1. If the query (m, L, θ) 6= (m∗ , L∗ , θ∗ ), D̄ simulates ORes in the same way above.
2. If the query (m, L, θ) = (m∗ , L∗ , θ∗ ), D̄ aborts the simulation and returns an
error message.
So far the attack environment required by D has been perfectly simulated. Note
that in θ∗ , the ring signature part (c∗0 , s∗0 , ..., s∗n−2 , w∗ ) can be perfectly simulated
by the algorithm PRSim. Concretely, we first compute e∗n−1 via σ ∗ and take this
e∗n−1 as the input of PRSim, then select the same s∗i to compute w∗ . Moreover,
due to the property zero-knowledge of (P,V), the simulated outputs generated by
PRPSim and the real outputs of the interactive proof PRP are indistinguishable.
The adversary D therefore can only get a negligible advantage from the simulated
outputs π ∗ . Finally, D outputs a bit b0 = b, if b0 = 1, that means the message M1
is encrypted, otherwise M0 , then D̄ wins its CCA2 encryption game. Hence our
AOFERS scheme is abuse-free if the underlying encryption scheme EN is CCA2secure.



Remark 5. Here, the proofs of security against signers, verifiers, the arbitrator
and signer ambiguity for abuse-free OFERS can be easily achieved by adapting the
proofs of non-abuse-free OFERS in Chapter 3. In our construction of fair exchange
of ring signatures, the only difference between non-abuse-free and abuse-free OFERS

4.4. Security Analysis

59

is whether a non-interactive or an interactive zero-knowledge proof is employed to
show the validity of encrypted ring signatures. Because these two zero-knowledge
proofs are almost same (both based on Camenisch and Michels’ zero-knowledge proof
[CM99]) but in different versions (non-interactive or interactive). These security
properties satisfied in non-abuse-free OFERS can also be satisfied in abuse-free
OFERS. However, some changes in the security proofs of abuse-free OFERS should
claim attention.
In abuse-free OFERS, the model of security against signers should be modified
as follow:
SetupTTP (κ) −→

(ASK, AP K)

(m, L∗ , θ, ς) ←−

AORes (AP K)

π

←−

PRP(m, L∗ , θ, ς, AP K)

σ

←−

Res(m, L∗ , θ, ASK)

Success of A

=

[PRVer(m, L∗ , θ, π, AP K)=1 ∧ RVer(m, L∗ , σ)=0]

Here, due to the existence of the simulation algorithms PRSim and PRPSim in
abuse-free OFERS, we require that the partial ring signature θ issued by A must be
verified via the interactive zero-knowledge proof PRP, and π should be the valid
outputs of the proof. That is because the evidence π alone is not enough to convince
the verifier the validity of the partial ring signature θ. It is necessary for the verifier
to ensure that π is correctly generated via PRP with the signer. The security
against signers in abuse-free OFERS still depends on the property soundness of the
interactive zero-knowledge proof system.
The models of security against verifiers and security against the arbitrator in
abuse-free OFERS are the same as those of non-abuse-free OFERS in Chapter 3
except the partial ring signature signing oracle OP RSig . In abuse-free OFERS, OP RSig
not only outputs partial ring signatures but also runs the interactive zero-knowledge
proofs PRP showing the validity of these partial signatures as the signer does. The
adversary can ask OP RSig for any partial ring signatures of his/her choosing, and
execute PRP with OP RSig to ensure these partial signatures are valid. Likewise, in
the model of signer ambiguity of abuse-free OFERS, the adversary can also check
the validity of the partial ring signatures via PRP, which allows the adversary
acquiring the complete information of these partial signatures.
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Summary

In this chapter, by updating the concept of optimistic fair exchange of ring signature (OFERS) in Chapter 3, we propose the notion of abuse-free optimistic fair
exchange of ring signatures (AOFERS) by formally defining its security model in the
multi-user setting under adaptive chosen message, chosen-key, and chosen publickey attacks. We follow Wang’s construction of abuse-free contract signing protocol [Wan10] to build an efficient and concrete AOFERS protocol based on Abe et
al.’s ring signature scheme in all discrete-log case. Then we extend the proposed
AOFERS protocol such that the generic scheme of Abe et al.’s ring signatures can
also be employed in our AOFERS construction efficiently. Finally, we prove that
the proposed AOFERS schemes are perfectly abuse-free in our security model.

Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, we study optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures, which aims to
provide better privacy for participants in fair exchange protocols, that is, two users
from two different groups can fairly exchange their ring signatures, and each user
is able to sign a message on behalf of its own group anonymously by inheriting
the property signer ambiguity of ring signatures. Such a fair exchange protocol
can effectively protect customers’ privacy in electronic commerce (e.g. preventing
customer’s trading habits from leaking).
In Chapter 1, we briefly introduce the history of fair exchange in computer
networks and discuss its applications. After reviewing some related achievements
in this fields, we explain why anonymity of participants is desirable when a fair
exchange protocol is executed between two members from distinct groups. Then we
propose an underlying solution on this issue, that is, optimistic fair exchange of ring
signatures.
After introducing some background knowledge and underlying technologies referred in this thesis in Chapter 2, we propose the notion of optimistic fair exchange
of ring signatures (OFERS) which allows two members from two different groups exchange their ring signatures in an equitable way with ambiguous signers for the other
group. We formalize OFERS and propose a strong security model in the multi-user
setting under adaptive chosen message, chosen-key, and chosen public-key attacks.
By combining the technologies of ring signatures, zero-knowledge proof and public
key encryption, we construct the first efficient and concrete OFERS scheme from
verifiably encrypted ring signatures (VERS) based on Abe et al.’s all discrete-log
ring signature scheme. And for adversaries in different roles, we formally prove that
the proposed OFERS scheme is secure against signers, verifiers and the arbitrator
and perfectly inherits the property signer ambiguity of ring signatures (Chapter 3).
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In Chapter 4, we improve our OFERS scheme in order to provide the property abuse-freeness in our fair exchange protocol. We formally define abuse-free
optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures (AOFERS) and its security model via
updating the security definitions of OFERS in Chapter 3, and propose a concrete
AOFERS scheme based on Abe et al.’s all discrete-log ring signature scheme. Furthermore, we extend our AOFERS scheme such that the generic scheme of Abe et
al.’s ring signatures can also be employed in our AOFERS construction efficiently.
By modifying Camenisch and Michels’ interactive zero-knowledge proof [CM99], our
AOFERS schemes are perfectly abuse-free against not only the off-line attack but
also the on-line attack introduced in [Wan10].
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on the topic of fair exchange
to present the formal security model of (abuse-free) optimistic fair exchange of ring
signatures and concrete solutions with provable security. All the security proofs are
achieved in a strong security model, that is, in the multi-user setting under adaptive
chosen message, chosen-key and chosen public-key attacks.
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Gilles Brassard, David Chaum, and Claude Crépeau. Minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge. J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 37(2):156–189,
1988.

[BDPR98]

Mihir Bellare, Anand Desai, David Pointcheval, and Phillip Rogaway.
Relations among notions of security for public-key encryption schemes.
In CRYPTO, pages 26–45, 1998.
63

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[BF98]

64

Colin Boyd and Ernest Foo. Off-line fair payment protocols using
convertible signatures. In ASIACRYPT, pages 271–285, 1998.

[BFM88]

Manuel Blum, Paul Feldman, and Silvio Micali. Non-interactive zeroknowledge and its applications (extended abstract). In STOC, pages
103–112, 1988.

[BG06]

Mihir Bellare and Oded Goldreich. On probabilistic versus deterministic provers in the definition of proofs of knowledge. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), 13(136), 2006.

[BGLS03]

Dan Boneh, Craig Gentry, Ben Lynn, and Hovav Shacham. Aggregate
and verifiably encrypted signatures from bilinear maps. In EUROCRYPT, pages 416–432, 2003.

[BLS04]

Dan Boneh, Ben Lynn, and Hovav Shacham. Short signatures from
the weil pairing. J. Cryptology, 17(4):297–319, 2004.

[Blu83]

Manuel Blum. How to exchange (secret) keys (extended abstract). In
STOC, pages 440–447, 1983.

[BM93]

Steven M. Bellovin and Michael Merritt. Augmented encrypted key exchange: A password-based protocol secure against dictionary attacks
and password file compromise. In ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages 244–250, 1993.

[BOGMR90] Michael Ben-Or, Oded Goldreich, Silvio Micali, and Ronald L. Rivest.
A fair protocol for signing contracts. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 36(1), 1990.
[Bol03]

Alexandra Boldyreva. Threshold signatures, multisignatures and blind
signatures based on the gap-Diffie-Hellman-group signature scheme. In
Public Key Cryptography, pages 31–46, 2003.

[Boy89]

Colin Boyd. Digital multisignatures. In Cryptography and Coding,
pages 241–246, 1989.

[BP97]

Niko Bari and Birgit Pfitzmann. Collision-free accumulators and failstop signature schemes without trees. In EUROCRYPT, pages 480–
494, 1997.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[BR93]

65

Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. Random oracles are practical: A
paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 62–73, 1993.

[BWZZ04]

Feng Bao, Guilin Wang, Jianying Zhou, and Huafei Zhu. Analysis
and improvement of Micali’s fair contract signing protocol. In ACISP,
pages 176–187, 2004.

[CA89]

David Chaum and Hans Van Antwerpen. Undeniable signatures. In
CRYPTO, pages 212–216, 1989.

[CD00]
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